The Failures of Piecemeal Diplomacy and the Day After

All eyes are on the negotiations for a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza. Despite the strenuous efforts, however, the picture does not seem rosy. The talks could falter as they had before, bringing us back to square one. Even if we assume that the negotiations will succeed, a compromise is reached despite the many difficult points of contention thanks to American efforts, especially its diplomatic and military moves, a truce is declared, the hostages are released, and a wider war in the region between Israel and Iran (and behind it Hezbollah) is averted. What would await us the day after? Would this success open the door to further negotiations that could give rise to a comprehensive solution?
In fact, the day after in Gaza is tied to a number of problems and difficult questions that could dispel optimism about stopping the killing machine and additional rounds of complementary negotiations. The first of these problems is the fate of Hamas and its role in Gaza, as well as the formula for allowing Yahya Sinwar to exercise his duties as its leader from above ground rather than tunnels and trenches, at a time when Israel holds him personally responsible for planning the October 7 operation and is determined to eliminate him and figures around him. There is no doubt that the negotiations would give Hamas some breathing room if they succeed, and there is also no doubt that its future would nonetheless remain linked to the major regional question, Iran’s role in the region and its patronage of proxies, which will continue so long as it considers them essential to maintaining regional influence.
This does not negate the fact that Hamas would be emerging exhausted from a devastating war that the Palestinians, before the Israelis, hold it responsible for. Moreover, Hamas is also struggling to deal with division within its ranks and the rifts between “Khomeini’s Hamas” and “Muslim Brotherhood’s Hamas,” and between the Gaza wing and the foreign wing. Hamas will not rule Gaza again, but it could maintain a presence in different forms. It could disarm and join a national unity government with the Palestinian Authority, or a technocratic government that it joins quietly, or come under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization under a different name. Regardless of the nature of its presence, Hamas will probably strive to maintain its military capabilities and stick to its political principles.
This same is true for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Even if it implements Resolution 1701, Hezbollah will not turn the page on resistance. It will remain a pawn that Iran can use to further its plans: avoiding direct involvement in a fully-fledged war and preventing a comprehensive settlement for the Palestinian question, which would “delegitimize” its intervention in the region, or rather the mobile wars it instigates to serve its interests.
The second problem is the mindset of Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist government, in addition to the divisions within Israeli society, which have deepened after the Gaza war turned into a war of attrition. It has become clear that this government is bent on denying the Palestinians all of their rights, and Al-Aqsa Flood has given it a reason to enter a war through which it seeks to root out the Palestinian cause, and not just eliminate Hamas. We also see it chasing a broader war that it seeks to drag the world, first and foremost the United States, into. Some might think that Netanyahu made a mistake when he ordered the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran seven hours after the assassination of Fuad Shukr in Beirut. However, he did so with the intention of provoking an escalation by Iran and Hezbollah that would drag them, especially Tehran, into direct war. A broader war is Netanyahu and his government’s baby. Given its composition, the government will not manage to accommodate the world’s vision for the day after in Gaza as it was laid out by President Joe Biden, who made clear that he will be pursuing one priority during what remains of time in office: ending the Gaza war and reinvigorating the American peace process in the Middle East.
This is not a rosy picture; rather, it carries the seeds of future conflict. Past experiences in the region have taught us that diplomacy which treats pain but does not address the root causes and lay out a comprehensive solution, is not enough. The current diplomatic efforts are everything but comprehensive. Is it the right time to change the course of the region? Can we, with the time we have left, present settlements amid heightened tensions between the conflicting parties? Most observers assume that Biden will fail to do much in the coming months. Others believe that he can now focus on concluding an Israeli-Arab normalization deal, which would likely be conditioned on ending the war in Gaza and a comprehensive settlement. All of that requires an Arab partner who can play a proactive and bold role in ushering in a sustainable diplomatic solution that saves the region from the current volatility and the perpetuation of tragic cycles of violence.
Peace will not be realized overnight, of course. However, we still have an opportunity to push the Biden administration, which has been working on a diplomatic path forward for months, and Kamala Harris, who seeks to spend the next four years in the White House, to chart a meaningfully different course. No one can erase the tragedies of the past nine months. However, the best approach for healing the pain and addressing the repercussions of everything that has happened during this war, is to open a new chapter. Biden and his vice president- like the Arabs- must not squander the opportunities available to them.