Yesterday morning (Thursday), the 26th of December, the National News Agency reported that the Israeli occupation forces had carried out an incursion into areas south of the Litani River. They entered the villages of Adshit al-Qusair and Qantara, which are close to the Litani River, and continued downward to Wadi al-Hujeir. It coincided with an Al-Arabiya report that Tel Aviv had informed the ceasefire monitoring committee that its forces might remain in the south after the 60-day period ends. These field developments were preceded by a violent airstrike in the northern Bekaa region a few days ago. Both add to over 270 violations of the agreement by Israel since it was signed, as it continues to violate Lebanese airspace with drones and reconnaissance planes, especially over the capital Beirut.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese government is awaiting US Special Envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein. On his next visit, which might be his last, Hochstein will address several issues, foremost among them the stabilization of the ceasefire, but in Israel’s favor. The Jewish state seeks to impose new rules of engagement, which may have been part of the agreement but have not been announced. The enemy wants total freedom of movement in Lebanon by land, air, and sea. Hochstein will discuss parliament’s election of a new president. Despite all the optimism that it is imminent, it does not seem that the deal has been fully baked yet, and the date set by Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri could well change.
In the south, Tel Aviv continues to dismantle Hezbollah's military capabilities, hit Hezbollah movements south of the river, and take action to prevent Hezbollah from returning, in addition to preventing its rearmament, even if force is required.
It is also exerting diplomatic and security pressure, with the help of Western allies, to ensure the implementation of the UN Resolutions that called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. That would entail the party handing over all the weapons it has across Lebanon. The party’s response can be divided into two tracks. First, imposing its own interpretation of the agreement, putting a spin on its stipulations and insisting that it only applies south of the river, repeatedly reiterating that it will not commit to some of the terms laid out in the agreement that had been signed by the Lebanese government and approved and overseen by Speaker Berri, the party’s main partner and only remaining ally. Second, the party insists, on the premise of its interpretation, on maintaining the other weapons to confront Israel’s intransigence in the future, that is, in order to be prepared for the possibility of Israel not withdrawing to behind the border or continuing to violate the agreement.
Indeed, the party clashed with enemy forces along the occupied strip of the border before Israel pulled out of the country in 2000, and its fighters used to infiltrate those areas. Its fighters now know the south like the palm of their hand and are ready to move militarily when the opportunity arises.
So far, the party is trying to deny the major shifts that have unfolded in Lebanon and the region. It has lost its domestic and regional allies, as well as some support from its base, amid broad discontent within the Shiite community due to the cost of the support war, the betrayal of allies, delays in reassuring southerners about compensation and reconstruction, suspicions of corruption in this regard, and political conditions set by donor countries that must be met before any assistance is provided.
While southerners fear for their safety and worry that they may not be able to return to their devastated villages, Hezbollah is seeking to re-legitimize its arsenal and shore up its partner's share in the state; essentially it wants to maintain the status quo and reproduce the regime’s corruption as though nothing had happened. Meanwhile, Israel roams free in the south, justifying its actions through the terms of an agreement sponsored by the party's partner in the "Shiite duo" and approved by the government it imposed on the Lebanese people. Thus, it could be said that the southerners will face heightened security risks if the enemy decides to settle the score in Lebanon definitively.
Accordingly, the ceasefire will not necessarily collapse, but a resumption of hostilities can no longer be ruled out. The enemy remains obstinate and might insist on maintaining its occupation. For its part, Hezbollah needs pretexts for its weapons. In this political equation, the crisis would not remain confined to the border. It would seep into the country, creating schisms between the community who reside south of the Litani River and cannot return, those who live north of the river and want to avoid the same fate, and between the party, which is clinging on to its weapons, and the majority of Lebanese people who oppose its narrative.
