This is nothing new; Iran is structurally split into “identity and politics.” This complex dynamic branches out of this binary into several social and cultural forces and groups, majorities and minorities, center and periphery, reformist and conservative, conservative and neo-conservative... a regular army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, police and Basij, religious creed and national identity.
All of the branches of this split reflect on policy, as well as Iran’s role and influence domestically and internationally. That is, the split between the state, the regime, and, currently, the revolution; and the divisions over Iran’s role, influence, and, currently as well, isolation, shape Iranian politics.
Despite their considerable impact on Iran’s political stability (and at critical junctures even on its territorial integrity), these splits, with their domestic and foreign policy implications, have also kindled a sort of political “dynamism” fueled by the power struggle between a ruling ideological minority and the opposing majority.
Historically, these internal divisions have only reflected on Iran’s rhetoric in the international arena, but not on Iran’s actions or influence abroad. Its influence is limited to the difference between soft and hard diplomacy, both of which blur the line between the interests of the state and those of the regime, as we saw at the recent Sharm el-Sheikh Summit that Tehran did not attend.
Over the months separating the Israeli attack on Iran on June 13 and the Sharm el-Sheikh summit held a few days ago, however, new and unprecedented divisions have begun to take shape in Iran. Actors from across the spectrum now recognize the need for Iran to engage in a political and strategic reassessment of its defense strategy and diplomatic posture. Both have evidently failed, undermining Iran’s national sovereignty and hindering progress in negotiations with other states.
Since the Israeli campaign in June, which achieved much of its objectives, criticism of the authorities has been increasing. Many have raged that the authorities performed poorly in both defense and offense, failing to safeguard Iran's national sovereignty and security. Former president Hassan Rouhani did not mince his words in criticizing the country’s strategic policies, and he was followed by many other moderate and reformist figures...
The backlash compelled decision-makers to elevate the standing of a moderate conservative official, Ali Larijani, appointing him secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in an attempt to contain the fallout that followed Israel’s attack and to signal that it is seeking to revitalize politics. Despite the symbolism of Larijani’s appointment, it has not eased fears nor quelled the divisions revealed by Iran’s stance toward the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.
Iran’s president refused to attend, while his foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, justified the decision by pointing to the hostile signals sent by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and to the obstacles imposed by US President Donald Trump.
This adds credibility to the notion that the position adopted by Araghchi, and all the domestic groups and elites who opposed participation in the summit, reflects deep concerns about Iran’s domestic political and strategic stability. Indeed, many of them have become convinced that a new war is all but inevitable.
Conversely, moderate and reformist elites criticized Tehran’s absence from the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit. They have warned that it could be the first step toward the country’s complete disappearance from the new geopolitical map. Their public dissatisfaction sends two indications: first, that the military balance dictated by the US now draws the boundaries of states’ roles and influence in the region and the world; second, that Iran squandered an opportunity to make its case by refusing to head to Sharm el-Sheikh, and it undermined its case by doing so while simultaneously calling for dialogue and negotiation with all the states who did attend. Its diplomatic absence cannot be compensated for by military shows of force, which only aggravate anxieties.
To return to the beginning: the current divisions and apprehensions are not mundane. They are less a sign of dynamism than a reflection of domestic confusion that can no longer be contained or restrained. “Division over foreign policy” and “apprehension regarding domestic politics” are no longer confined to Iran's sole decision-maker.
