Lebanese equivocation is a chronic existential threat engendered by successive periods of subjugation and occupation. These factors have generated two discourses: both considered “patriotic” by those who espouse them but irreconcilable. Together they encapsulate Lebanon’s divisions over major and minor issues alike, as well as both domestic and foreign policy, since the establishment of the Lebanese state.
Historically and currently, this equivocation has given rise to “patriotic” and “sovereigntist,” positions and slogans that failed to develop a shared definition of sovereignty and independence, or an inclusive conception of patriotism. As a result, these notions have been susceptible to contradictory connotations shaped by political interests and ideological or communal affiliations. This discord has undermined state-building and unity, and it has produced conflicting alignments in regional conflicts, as is manifest today in the complex dynamics of the approach to Iran and Israel.
Between an Iran that Lebanon has lost (as a political supporter of all Lebanese, not of a particular faction), and an Israel that it is impossible to win over, label as an ally, consider close to any Lebanese party, or even compel to end its threats or deter it militarily, Lebanese equivocation becomes evident in both official and elite positions.
The state’s position, articulated by Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, is clear and explicit with regard to the objective of negotiations with Israel. As for Tehran, Minister Rajji must adopt a firm diplomatic approach, demanding that it cease interfering in internal affairs. Yet it would be preferable, given his role as head of Lebanese diplomacy, for him to go to Tehran directly, not as a courtesy visit, but to deliver a frank message that safeguards the historical relations between the two peoples. He must explain to the Iranian leadership, which is in denial, the difference between the kind of role Lebanon would welcome and the interference or domination Lebanon rejects. He should also clarify that Iran’s cultural, commercial, and social ties must encompass all Lebanese groups, and that it cannot present itself as the guardian of a particular community, since only the state has the right to protect its citizens. As for Lebanese Shiites in particular, clear and forthright dialogue in Tehran would protect Lebanon’s Shiites and their role, as well as preserving the cultural and spiritual bonds that link them to Iran.
It would be beneficial for Iran’s leadership to hear from a senior Lebanese official, in Tehran, that Lebanon and its Shiite community are not a strategic tool in its arsenal, and that it cannot gamble with the lives of a foundational sect in the region’s conflicts on ideological grounds. And since the countries have diplomatic relations, there is no alternative to dealing with Iran as a political adversary that exercised hegemony over Lebanon for a time rather than as an existential enemy. That is what other Arab states have done, and the Saudi model stands out as an example of viable and responsible engagement.
On the other side of “Lebanese equivocation,” particularly of certain elites, peace with the Israeli enemy cannot be regarded as an option or political preference. The wishful thinking of some Lebanese rushing to reach peace accords (modeled on ambiguous precedents that have emerged in recent years) under current conditions, is vehemently rejected by no fewer than half of the Lebanese population. The example of the May 17, 1983 agreement (a security-political agreement between Lebanon and Israel), signed under occupation, did not lead to peace. It was abandoned by those who had negotiated it, not by those who claimed to have overthrown it in what became known as the February 6, 1984 uprising against the government of President Amin Gemayel. This episode shows that whenever Lebanese elites have come close to contemplating peace on patriotic terms, they have run up against its structural impossibility.
That does not imply burdening Lebanon with the Arab–Israeli conflict. Rather, it means acknowledging the domestic structural obstacles that any separate peace agreement that does not fall within a comprehensive Arab settlement (or within the track led by Riyadh and conditioned on a “two-state solution”) impossible. Damascus also recognizes this. It seeks security arrangements that would put an end to armed confrontation, not to the conflict itself, which may take non-violent forms.
Accordingly, the Lebanese equivocation on Iran and Israel must be taken apart. Iran, as a state and a people, shares vast commonalities with the peoples and states of the region, and they are deeper than the actions and transgressions of its regime. As for Israel, its fanatical society recognizes no other, as evidenced by the positions of political representatives. Its politicians speak for a society that overwhelmingly shares almost nothing in common with the peoples of the region.
