It is difficult to understand developments on the two burning fronts of Lebanon and Gaza in isolation from the outcomes of Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. The visit is unlikely to generate magical solutions to these deeply complex crises, but it could determine whether the growing impression (which we have from diplomatic leaks) that the global trajectory is moving toward partial or incremental settlements. This impression was reinforced by the statements of US envoy Tom Barrack, for example, who described Lebanon’s demand to disarm Hezbollah by force as “unrealistic,” and warned that it could lead to civil war. as well as reports about an Egyptian initiative to “freeze the arms.” The American Ambassador in Beirut, Michel Issa, and President Joseph Aoun are also reportedly on the same page, on the premise of confining armament to the state without destabilizing security.
If these indications are accurate, the area south of the Litani River could be transformed into a demilitarized zone that the Lebanese army is deployed to. However, in this scenario, the issues are the security belt, the economic zone, and the force that would replace UNIFIL would not be resolved. The prevailing conclusion is that the complete disarmament of southern Lebanon that meets Israel’s security needs, but it seems that it would be coupled with a proposal Israel may reject: transferring heavy and precision back missiles to Iran, while medium and light weapons are maintained north of the Litani and “containment.”
If this conclusion is valid, it would mean that the US approach is to neutralize the direct threat to Israel without addressing the issue of illegal weapons in Lebanon as a foundational sovereignty problem. Even if heavy weapons are removed from the equation and the south is neutralized, Lebanon will remain hostage to an armed party capable of obstruction that can impose its will. In the Lebanese experience, weapons have never been a mere military tool. Arms are always used for political ends.
The problem becomes even more difficult with the assumption that Hezbollah would be rendered a Lebanese party fully integrated into the political game. This proposal ignores the party’s ideological nature: it did not emerge as a local movement. It cannot adapt and evolve; it is organically linked to a regional project led by Iran: weapons, doctrine, and geopolitical function are inseparable. The party’s identity is linked to Tehran, and that is not negotiable.
For Israel, this formula is likely to be handled with cautious pragmatism, an interim arrangement that reduces risks on the northern front without providing a conclusive solution. Keeping Hezbollah’s arms north of the Litani means postponing the threat rather than eliminating it, making any acceptance conditional on the right to intervene militarily when necessary.
In Gaza, the success of the second phase of President Donald Trump’s plan depends on several factors: the US role, the nature of the international stabilization force, Netanyahu’s position, Hamas’s refusal to disarm, and the role of the Palestinian Authority. The outcome may be either partial implementation, cosmetic measures that perpetuate the status quo, or failure and chaos. In fact, Gaza has become divided into two zones: one under Israeli control, where reconstruction under international supervision can begin, and another under Hamas control, which is in a state of paralysis and will remain so until we see a resolution of the arms issue. Although Arab states have declared they will not confront Hamas militarily, they support efforts to strip it of its political legitimacy. For its part, Hamas insists on maintaining the weapons and advances ambiguous alternatives such as freezing them. Egypt and Turkey prefer separating forces and postponing disarmament, while Israel insists on remaining in the Strip along the “yellow line” to prevent Hamas from rearming.
The problem in Lebanon and Gaza is one and the same: weapons remaining in the hands of non-state actors. In Lebanon, this is a fundamental sovereignty crisis; in Gaza, it is an obstacle to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state that is compounded by the hardline taken by Israel’s religious right, which rejects any viable settlement.
If the option of containment consolidates in Lebanon and Hamas is left in control of part of Gaza, the US strategic objective would not have failed. However, we would be facing a political impasse: how can we deal with ideological non-state actors that have a social base and links to Iran without pushing Lebanon to implosion, bringing a new bloodbath to Gaza, or dragging the region into a broader confrontation.
The problem is not the shift from the term “disarmament” to “containment,” but the absence of a comprehensive vision that addresses the weapons of Hezbollah and Hamas as a crisis of statehood, not merely a threat on Israel’s border. The piecemeal approach, which reflects newly emerging complexities in decision-making in Washington, keeps Lebanon and Gaza in a fragile gray zone. They would be managed and rendered elements of a broader basket of regional priorities, where stability is assessed as the capacity to prevent implosion, not the emergence of a fully sovereign state in Lebanon and a stable Palestinian state in the future.
Hope for a better future for Lebanon and Gaza cannot come from containment, which aggravates the division between a state that administers and a militia that decides, managing the conflict instead of ending it. Instead, the two-state solution must be revived because it is the only framework that can neutralize Hamas, Hezbollah, and extremist settlers alike rather than containing or appeasing them. As long as weapons remain outside the state and settler violence continues, every ceasefire will remain fragile, and peace will remain distant.
