On December 19, 2025, US President Donald Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which included the permanent repeal of the Caesar Act. Nearly a month earlier - before this step lifted the crippling sanctions imposed on Damascus under the former regime - Ahmad al-Sharaa visited the White House, becoming the first Syrian president to do so in the history of relations between the two countries. The visit followed a meeting with Trump in Riyadh, arranged at the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.
Al-Sharaa’s representatives have since held direct and indirect talks with Israel. He has visited Moscow, is preparing a trip to China, and represented Syria at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. This diplomatic surge is unfolding within a complex regional equation surrounding Syria, one whose most dangerous element lies in Israel’s heavy objectives, as Tel Aviv appears the external actor most intent on intervening against Damascus.
Beyond its unsuccessful efforts to obstruct the repeal of the Caesar sanctions, the Israeli military has carried out more than 600 operations inside Syrian territory since Dec. 8, 2024 - an average of two strikes a day - often on what critics describe as flimsy pretexts. Yet Israel’s calculations toward Damascus are broader and more intricate, and can be distilled into five core pillars.
First, the Israeli government insists that Syria’s recognition of Israeli “sovereignty” over the Golan Heights is an indispensable prerequisite for any peace agreement. Trump recently reaffirmed his recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, boasting that he had “given” the territory to Israel, despite the UN General Assembly’s December 2, 2025 vote in favor of an Egyptian-backed resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Golan to the June 4, 1967 lines.
Second, Israel is determined to retain control of the disengagement zone established by the 1974 agreement. Its forces entered the area just hours after opposition forces moved into Damascus, seizing roughly 400 additional square kilometers of Syrian territory. The aim is to entrench a buffer zone stripped of heavy weaponry stretching from south of Damascus toward Israel, including Mount Hermon, alongside what effectively amounts to a no-fly zone. Under this vision, the Syrian army’s presence would be limited to lightly armed security and police units tasked solely with maintaining internal order.
Third, while Israel rejects the prospect of southern Syria becoming a sphere of influence for Ankara, its political establishment believes a workable modus vivendi with Türkiye is possible, based on mutual recognition of each side’s “legitimate security interests” in Syria. Tel Aviv acknowledges Türkiye’s existential security priorities in northern Syria, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue and preventing the emergence of separatist entities. In return, it expects Turkish recognition that southern Syria - from Damascus to the Golan - is a vital Israeli security zone in which the expansion of armed factions is unacceptable.
Fourth, Israel insists on unrestricted freedom of action for its air force in Syrian airspace. The objective is no longer limited to striking weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah.
Fifth, Israel treats what it calls the “Druze priority” as a cornerstone of its Syria strategy. This approach is driven by pressure from Druze communities inside Israel, an integral component of its security establishment, as well as by a geopolitical ambition to transform Sweida and Jabal al-Arab into a secular “social buffer zone” that would prevent militias or radical organizations from advancing toward Israel’s borders. To this end, Israel seeks recognition of a special status for the Druze that would guarantee a degree of self-administration, using the issue to justify direct military intervention and the retention of strategic areas such as the summit of Mount Hermon.
By contrast, President al-Sharaa’s strategy rests on three pillars. The first is prioritizing economic stability, abandoning radical rhetoric, and focusing on reconstruction at an estimated cost of $216 billion. The second is consolidating international legitimacy through a security partnership with Washington that redefines Syria as a “partner in counterterrorism.” This has taken shape through Syria’s joining of the international coalition against ISIS and was operationalized in the joint “Eagle Eye” operation targeting the group. The third pillar is a firm commitment to preventing Syria’s fragmentation into separate entities.
As 2025 draws to a close, Syria stands at a crossroads shaped by lofty national ambitions and complex regional crosscurrents. While Tel Aviv seeks to impose a rigid security reality and Türkiye aspires to inherit the roles once played by Iran and Russia, Damascus finds strategic depth in an Arab umbrella led by Saudi Arabia and in the Trump administration’s desire to see the “Syrian model” succeed. From Damascus’ perspective, the objective is clear: to ensure that Syria’s stability flows from the strength and cohesion of the state, not from subservience to the dictates of geopolitics.
