Following the fast-moving scene in Iran, one could be misled. The mass protests, far from the first to erupt against a regime that emerged on ideological (theocratic) grounds nearly five decades ago.
Bolder and less fearful, the youths have begun to rise as the economy wobbles under the weight of sanctions and mismanagement, but change proves elusive. Here, a question emerges: is Iran finally on the cusp of an implosion, or are we witnessing the slow erosion of the region that will end with change from within? Different scenarios are on the table.
The most important for the Gulf states is which of these two scenarios would do more to threaten their security and stability in the short and medium term: massive, uncalculated change, or a slow decline in a region that cannot tolerate surprises. Both come with costs.
Anticipating the first scenario, a big bang, entails mass discontent reaching a point of no return and the convergence of four elements at a single moment: a comprehensive popular uprising that goes beyond major cities, a real split within the regime’s hard institutional core, an international environment that allows for - or turns a blind eye to - radical change in Tehran, and alternative leadership with a program and acceptable figures.
So far, these elements have not come together. The Iranian street is in flames, but the movement lacks organization and leadership. The regime remains cohesive; and the international community, for now, treats Iran as a problem to be contained and managed, not a regime to be overthrown. Regardless of how high the cost of survival may be, it is still lower than the cost of uncalculated change.
From the perspective of Gulf security, an implosion is the most dangerous scenario. State collapse could open the door to chaos, ethnic violence, and a struggle for control and state institutions, with the risk of violence spilling into the region. Any strategic vacuum in Iran would also invite direct international and regional interventions, pulling the Gulf back into the heart of an open conflict whose outcomes and duration cannot be predicted. Most influential powers seek to avoid this eventuality.
The second scenario, slow erosion, seems more likely given development on the ground. In this hypothetical trajectory, the regime does not fall all at once, but gradually changes from within, under pressure from the economy, society, and generational shifts within the ruling elite. The signs of this erosion are clear: revolutionary rhetoric is declining as a discourse of pragmatism gains strength within state institutions, the gap between state and society is widening, and protests are now less exceptional events than periodic outbreaks.
Moreover, the regime faces intractable problems. It seeks to acquire a nuclear program, dedicating vast financial resources to this end and isolating itself on the world stage. At the same time, it seeks to keep its economy afloat and break this isolation. These are two irreconcilable objectives: since antagonizing and provoking key global powers, whether through advanced enrichment or via armed proxies designated as terrorist groups that destabilize neighboring countries, kills any real chance of economic recovery. Rather than strengthening Iran, these policies effectively undermine it.
This equation has drained Iranian power in all its economic and political dimensions, eroded public hope for a near exit from the impasse, and, with declining living standards and the erosion of the middle class, popular protests have multiplied and drawn closer together in time.
Here, the comparison with Venezuela rises to the fore. Venezuela’s regime clung to a rigid ideology that led to severe economic collapse, international sanctions, and mass protests, but the regime did not collapse in a moment. Instead, both its state and society were hollowed out, with power maintained through security forces and foreign alliances. When the president was detained, some people danced in the streets, while the top brass prepared to cooperate. The case of Venezuela shows that ideological regimes can endure for long periods, even as they manage poverty instead of development, unless something changes at the top of the pyramid.
Iran is not Venezuela, but it could take a similar path, adjusting for differences in context. Iran is a regional actor in a volatile neighborhood, which makes the cost of its erosion higher for its neighbors. Still, the survival of an eroding regime remains a real possibility, especially if international equations do not change or the regime does not split from within.
For the Gulf, this scenario carries a delicate paradox. Slow erosion is less dangerous than a comprehensive explosion, but more troubling over the long term. An internally beleaguered Iran may be more inclined to export its crises and use regional arenas as pressure cards. At the same time, this erosion opens a limited window for managing tensions through small, swift wars.
Waiting for Tehran to collapse in a moment will not safeguard Gulf security, nor will managing tensions over the medium or long term. A deep understanding of the trajectory of Iran’s erosion, or unforeseen developments, is needed, so that we can prepare for the consequences and address the risks without being drawn into a costly confrontation. This requires cohesive, long-term Gulf policies that balance deterrence with precaution and protect regional stability from the repercussions of slow or sudden collapse.
To conclude: politics is the art of avoiding calamity.
