The recent shifts in the Yemeni scene have led us to a revealing moment that cannot be read as a fleeting divergence in tactics among those involved, especially those that do not share a border with Yemen. Indeed, it must be read transparently: as a structural clash between two conceptions of geopolitics.
On the one hand, we have an approach founded on seizing control of coasts and ports, which are seen as a gateway to influence and power. Here, there is little regard for any other consideration, and rather than partnership, there is only transactionalism, drawing inspiration from the doctrines of “sea power” the American admiral and historian Alfred Mahan. The opposing vision is more closely aligned with the realities of land, history, and identity. It is simply grounded in “land,” as articulated by the British geographer Halford Mackinder. Here, Yemen is seen as an important part of the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula, and maritime considerations cannot lead to neglect for the social and political center, let alone history, identity, and culture as they have been formed over past decades. These factors have shaped its demography and its regional position, as well as its organic relationship with its neighbors, foremost among them Saudi Arabia.
The logic of the state is a long-term investment that takes a holistic view of repercussions and recognizes the inevitability of geography, as well as the memory of history in Yemen- a country that has been plagued by chaos for most of its modern history, with only a few exceptions. Accordingly, the outcome can be discerned beforehand: whoever bets on ports alone loses, and whoever invests in land, identity, and development ultimately prevails, no matter how long it takes.
Historically, Yemen’s coastline (stretching along both the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea) has always tempted regional powers that saw in them an opportunity to rapidly build maritime influence through control of corridors and chokepoints.
This approach has always quickly collided with the realities of Yemen, which resists simplification. It is a complex society, deeply rooted tribes, with a profound political memory, and a long history of entrenched identity. Yemen cannot be hijacked by a minority, no matter how much it invests in slogans and fallacies or whatever it does to exploit vacuums and opportunities to further foreign interests.
Riyadh’s approach is clear and transparent. It has been frankly conveyed to the international community: Yemen constitutes a direct geographic and historical extension of the security of the Arabian Peninsula. The long-shared border between the two countries (1,200 kilometers) is not merely a line on a map. These are points of contact with a single social and cultural space, meaning that disorder in Yemen is a direct threat to Saudi national security.
It is in this light that we can conceive of the “heartland” in the context of this region: whoever approaches developments in Yemen must prioritize the interests of its people, first and foremost by invoking the unifying political entity regardless of its specific form, and pursue a consensual political structure. Whoever can manage Yemen’s diversity through dialogue and fair representation holds the key to genuine stability, however long it may take. The coasts, by contrast, are a product of this stability, not a substitute for it.
The developments of the past few years have proven that betting on local armed forces or secessionist projects orchestrated by foreign powers may yield quick tactical gains but deepens fragmentation and lays the foundations for perpetual chaos. Riyadh grasped this early on and gradually moved toward redefining its intervention, supporting the national state rather than hybrid entities.
In this context, the recent Saudi shift toward direct engagement in Yemen, imposing the logic of “the state versus proxies,” can be understood as a return to the correct geographical reading rather than a mere recalibration of policy. Yemen, in this vision, is not governed through islands and ports, but through legitimacy and dialogue that addresses domestic priorities and presents them to international institutions.
The Saudi approach -by virtue of its position as a central, effective power with a developmental project that does not seek hegemony but the consolidation of stability in the region- does not see Yemen as a collective of ports or isolated zones of influence. This narrow, opportunistic conception is not only unrealistic; it would also wreak havoc. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has decided to deal with Yemen as an integrated sovereign space that requires state-building and institutions, which is why the Kingdom is creating space for dialogue among its components and maintaining equal distance in order to prevent its disintegration into cantons.
Today, given the point we have reached, Saudi Arabia has recognized and taken decisive action to address the “coastal trap” in Yemen. This trap is akin to privileging one sectarian component over others. It is an ideological illusion no less deceptive than the geopolitical illusion of ports, which rests on investing in nascent entities under the banners of ostensibly just causes.
Despite its deep wounds, Yemen has robust foundations that can be built upon once statehood is prioritized and the country is liberated from the logic of tutelage and sub-projects. Here, the Saudi vision that seeks stability and unity within this political entity, falls into place. Saudi Arabia does conceive of Yemen as a burden, a sphere of influence, or an opportunity, but as a partner that can be revitalized when its people, all of its people, are granted the opportunity to determine their future, free of arms and sedition.
