However tempting it may be, the comparison “Suez moment,” which is seen as the historical juncture that confirmed the decline of the British Empire, and the United States’ battle to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to free it from Iranian control, is somewhat misleading . The United States of today is not the Britain of 1956.
The appeal of this parallel is clear. Six decades ago, Britain waged war on Egypt alongside France and Israel following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. Reclaiming the canal from Egyptian control was their nominal objective of the “Tripartite Aggression” but the real aim was to topple Nasser’s regime. The war failed to achieve either objective after the US intervened to force Britain’s withdrawal.
This time, the war began with a joint American–Israeli attack that sought to overthrow the Iranian regime and damage its nuclear and missile programs. The conflict has led to the disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as Iran threatened oil tankers and tried to impose illegal transit fees. More than a month into the war, the fate of the strait has become a central issue of whatever settlement ends it.
Two empires waged a conflict against a “revolutionary” Middle Eastern regime alongside Israel in a seemingly asymmetrical war with the fate of a vital maritime artery at stake. That is where, however, the superficial parallel between the Suez Crisis and the current conflict ends.
The problem with the comparison lies in its implicit conclusions. Years from now, we may indeed look back on this conflict as one of a sign of the American empire’s decline. Likening the current situation the Strait of Hormuz to the Suez moment prematurely assumes that the era of American dominance is nearing its end.
Britain’s humiliating withdrawal did not mark the beginning of the empire’s decline. It formally announced the death of a global power that had already been perishing since the end of World War II. The world was entering the Cold War era of American dominance and competition with the Soviet Union. Britain, meanwhile, had been in economic and global decline since the end of World War I. The British pound had lost its position as the world’s leading currency to the dollar under the Bretton Woods system that consolidated Washington’s control over the global economy, which remains to this day.
Of course, President Donald Trump understands that failing to restore the pre-war status quo at the strait would constitute a political and strategic defeat that would be difficult to justify. This failure would, however, not signal the end of American dominance anytime soon. The United States remains the largest military and economic power in the world, with no clear alternative on the horizon.
To put things into perspective, US military spending in 2024 reached roughly one trillion dollars, more than one-third of global military expenditure. Today, there is no real alternative ready to replace the US dollar, which is used for about 60 percent of global central bank reserves and roughly 90 percent of foreign exchange transactions, not to mention its role in pricing most global trade.
That is, the global economy’s center of gravity has not moved in a way that can be compared to the shift of the mid-twentieth century.
Its economic dominance gives the United States the ability to turn the dollar into a political instrument. Because most transactions pass through the American banking system, the government can isolate actors from the global financial system. The repeated use of sanctions, particularly during Trump’s tenure, has amplified calls for the creation of a new system.
Nevertheless, even prominent American economists critical of Trump’s policies consider such a transformation unlikely in the near term. Paul Krugman, who recently wrote that Iran’s attempt to impose transit fees in Chinese yuan is intended to humiliate the United States, but it would not undermine the dollar.
Finally, the comparison is problematic because of the difference between the waterways at the center of the two conflicts. Unlike the Suez Canal, which was dug by thousands of Egyptian laborers- many of whom had lost their lives in the process- transit fees were never levied at the Strait of Hormuz. Say what you will about Nasser and the legitimacy of his decision to nationalize the canal, his supporters can argue that he reclaimed ownership of a fundamentally Egyptian asset. The Strait of Hormuz does not belong to Iran.
In sum, the Suez Crisis was not merely a struggle over a canal; it formally announced the end of a global power that had failed to impose its will on an international system it no longer controlled. If the US fails to restore stability to the Strait of Hormuz, it would still be a defeat, but not one that signals a major shift in the global balance of power.
