When the revolution triumphed in Iran in 1979, it produced a hybrid system combining "republicanism" and "Islamism." Sovereign decisions are ultimately made with the blessing of the "Supreme Leader" in the “Wilayat al-Faqih” system developed by Ruhollah Khomeini. This doctrine constituted an extension of most of the powers of the "Hidden Imam," granting the Supreme Leader both religious legitimacy and constitutional authority under Iran's new constitution.
Accordingly, the architects of this system designed institutions and mechanisms to render Khomeini's vision into a constitutional framework; elected state institutions would nonetheless be overseen by the Supreme Leader.
Several of these institutions were tasked with making the consequential decisions, particularly those relating to war, peace, and foreign relations. Iranian policy toward the Gulf states and the United States cannot be understood through the Foreign Ministry alone, as it is only one component of a deeply interlocking network of institutions involved in shaping and executing policy.
The Iranian constitution does not vest foreign policy in a single body, nor does it grant the president absolute authority over sovereign affairs. Instead, it has a hierarchical structure that culminates in the Supreme Leader, and it is shaped by the Supreme National Security Council, military institutions, advisory and legislative councils, before being expressed by the Foreign Ministry.
Article 110 is the cornerstone of the Iranian constitution. It grants the Supreme Leader the authority to "determine the general policies of the system" after consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council, and to "supervise their proper implementation." He is also the commander of the armed forces, granting him the authority to declare war, peace and the power to appoint the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and senior military officials. That is, constitutionally speaking, the Supreme Leader is the center of gravity of the entire state.
Under Article 113, the president is the country's highest ranking official, second only to the Leader. He heads the executive branch, with one explicit carve-out for "matters directly related to the leadership." The president manages the government, coordinates ministers, and chairs the Supreme National Security Council, giving Iranian policy a civilian face. Yet the major issues (questions of war and peace, relations with Washington, the nuclear program, regional deterrence) are the Supreme Leader's prerogative, in consultation with the relevant institutions.
The Supreme National Security Council is tasked with translating the Leader's broad directives into operational decisions.
Article 176 states that the Council exists to "secure national interests and safeguard the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty." Its mandate includes building a defense and security policy with a framework set by the Leader, coordinating political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic activities tied to defense and security, and mobilizing state resources to meet threats.
The Council’s make-up is complicated. It includes the heads of the three branches of government, the chief of the armed forces general staff, the commander of the IRGC, the army commander, two representatives appointed by the Leader, the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, intelligence, and defense, and the Council's secretary-general.
Currently headed by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the Council plays a pivotal role in shaping national security and defense policy. Its decisions, however, only become executable once approved by the leadership authority, as the constitution requires.
The Foreign Ministry operates on an altogether different playing field. It is tasked with "implementing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran," meaning it does not set political parameters but rather executes, coordinates, and manages political relations along the lines set for it. A foreign minister may advance an initiative or articulate a position, but the weight of that position ultimately rests on its alignment with the decisions of the Supreme National Security Council and the approval of the Supreme Leader.
What, then, of the Revolutionary Guard Corps that has been so prominently in the recent war, embodying the regime's hard power?
Constitutionally, Article 150 assigns the Guard the mission of "protecting the Revolution and its achievements." In foreign policy, however, the IRGC does not function as a formal diplomatic institution. It plays a central role in deterrence, proxy forces, long-range missiles, and maritime corridors, and this has become starkly evident in the recent war between Iran and the combined force of the United States and Israel.
Compounded by the ambiguity that followed the assassination of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the fact that his successor Mojtaba Khamenei has yet to appear publicly, these overlapping responsibilities have made Iran's decision-making process even more opaque, as the IRGC holds more weight than before. Despite its growing influence, however, the IRGC has not become the sole decision-maker. The Leader's Office remains at the apex. Decisions are made through coordination and consultation among the Leader's Office, the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council, and the man recently thrust to international prominence, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Mojtaba Khamenei blesses their conclusions and guides while the Foreign Ministry executes.
The trajectory Iran will take after the war depends on the balance among these actors. If decision-making remains concentrated within a narrow security circle, negotiations will likely become more rigid and political flexibility will diminish. But if diplomacy regains meaningful space within the Supreme National Security Council, ad-hoc deals could emerge. They would not change the fundamental nature of the regime, merely reducing the costs of war and opening the door to gradual progress on the most urgent issues: The Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear program, ballistic missiles, armed militias, and Iran's hostile actions toward its Arab neighbors.
