A memorandum of understanding is not a wedding invitation. It is neither a declaration of victory nor a surrender. Many devils will arise once the table expands to address the details. The negotiators will swallow doses of poison on behalf of those whom they represent, if they choose not to resume the conflict.
Donald Trump is not interested in a new round of fighting. It seems that Iran’s Supreme Leader has reached the same conclusion. This time, the winds turned against the sails of Benjamin Netanyahu, who believes that the war has not yet been completed in Iran or Lebanon, nor anywhere else, perhaps. The memorandum of understanding looks like a piece of cake, but it has been spiked with poison through concealed clauses. Disappointment surrounds its vague framing.
Trump will find a pretext to speak of victory, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps will “cook up” something similar. Netanyahu, meanwhile, will be portrayed as the big loser, as the driver asked him to get out of the car before reaching his destination.
Trump would have probably preferred a different ending to the war with Iran, a Hollywood ending that would fill television screens with images of him raising his fist or doing his signature dance. At one point, he might have dreamed of heeding the distress call coming from an exhausted Iran, allowing him to add it to his list of achievements and to add its oil wealth to his Venezuelan acquisitions. He may also have dreamed of some kind of rift within the Iranian regime, which he repeatedly insisted had been changed by decapitations during the opening stages of the offensive.
Dreams are one thing; reality is another. Iran suffered painful blows, but it did not seek a way out. Iran behaved as though it had always known that this difficult moment would arrive. It had prepared tunnels, missiles, and drones for it. It went even further: Iran held the global economy hostage and created a crisis called the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which became the central concern, overtaking the nuclear and missile files in the calculations of both nearby and distant states.
The Iranian leadership that emerged after the Israeli and American strikes also demonstrated that it has near-suicidal tendencies, especially when it threatened to target Gulf infrastructure in response to potential US strikes on Iranian energy facilities.
Trump had wished for a different ending, but the American people did not welcome a war that raised fuel prices. Their unease deepened, particularly after it had become clear that a swift war was neither realistic nor likely, raising indications that they could hold Trump and his party accountable in the approaching elections.
If the memorandum of understanding opens closed doors, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, and ends the blockade, then one may speak of a prominent victor in this difficult challenge: Field Marshal Asim Munir, who played the role of physician. It is a victory that reinforces his already strong standing at home and enhances the role of his nation that is situated among the Asian giants.
The field marshal knows about war. He has experienced war and understands its costs and wounds that never heal. He succeeded in leveraging his country’s relations with Washington and Beijing, and Tehran and Riyadh. With a mixture of stringency and patience, he managed the maturation of positions. If the memorandum of understanding succeeds in opening closed doors, Asim Munir will enter history, with his name associated with an agreement rather than through the horrors of war.
What conclusions will Iran draw from the war? Will it conclude that the revolution had sent the country on a mission beyond its capabilities when it dreamed of expelling the “Great Satan” from the region? Will it feel that the task of removing the “cancerous tumor” is not as easy as it once portrayed it? Israel is a nuclear state, and its army may well be the most capable in the region, while the West will never tolerate any serious effort to shake its foundations.
Will Iran conclude that it has just finished the first round, and that it must prepare for the next, even if delayed? Will it decide, for example, that it needs aircraft to protect its skies and to avoid seeing Israeli fighter jets roaming free above Tehran? Will it conclude that the solution is to obtain air defense systems, compelling it to knock insistently on the doors of Moscow and Beijing?
Will Iran’s decision-makers conclude that it is time to reconcile with the world and move closer to international law? That Iran must coexist. It must stop violating their airspace or treating their territory, taking them hostage under the pretext of confronting American bases. Will a growing number of regime elites come to understand that addressing others through missiles, drones, and proxy militias only expands the circle of enemies and damages Iran and its image?
Will the generals of the Revolutionary Guard Corps feel that they burdened their country beyond its capacity? That the dreams of General Qasem Soleimani - “cutting the American thread” and placing Israel “on the road towards its demise” - are impossible to realize under the current balance of power?
Will some among them conclude that Iran must learn to live with its neighbors within the framework of international law and the principles of good neighborliness? Do any of them believe Iran should build a successful, attractive, and convincing model instead of an alarming, faltering, and frightening state?
It is clear that Netanyahu will face harsh questions from his many opponents. The Iranian regime did not fall, nor was the arsenal of Hezbollah eliminated. Nonetheless, he will find some consolation in saying that Iran was defeated in Gaza and Syria and has become weaker in Lebanon. He will say that he has retaliated to every attack bearing Iranian fingerprints, and that he went beyond killing generals to targeting the Supreme Leader himself. And he will certainly claim that he removed the specter of an Iranian bomb, or at least delayed it for years.
Generals are disappointed when war does not culminate in a decisive victory. Only one general can speak of victory without fighting: General Asim Munir.
