Lebanon is not doing very well, and this is known to all, near and far. Part of its territory is once again under Israeli occupation, after it had been liberated in 2000 unconditionally, without a peace agreement or even a security arrangements deal- an unprecedented achievement compared with what happened on the other Arab fronts.
The first support war (2023) and the second one (2026) have drained an economy that had already been in collapse as a major financial and economic crisis, the Beirut Port explosion, and the coronavirus pandemic, not to mention rampant corruption and the absence of any reform vision or measures. Even the democratic parliamentary elections were postponed for two years, a huge step backward.
While it would be unfair to say that the hopes pinned on the new president and government have evaporated, the signs of Lebanese schisms are deepening and widening- an omen of grave consequences, especially now that Israel has returned to exert a powerful influence over domestic developments in Lebanon (not only by reviving the odious language of treason accusations, but also by exploiting these divisions and feeding it in one way or another, directly or indirectly).
Observers find one Lebanese political discourse that leans toward absolving Israel of all the crimes it has committed and continues to commit: targeting civilians, striking hospitals and ambulance crews, razing villages to the ground, and violating Lebanese sovereignty daily by sea, land, and air. On the other side, we have a discourse that refuses to acknowledge that the "balance of deterrence" celebrated from 2006 to 2023 collapsed with the assassination of Hezbollah's leaders, the ground incursion, the pager attack, and all the other blows that set Lebanon back years.
The split has extended to the question of negotiations. Will the Islamabad track bring Lebanon stability, or the Washington track of bilateral Lebanese-Israeli talks? In both cases, Israel continues to violate the ceasefire daily, destroying the villages of southern Lebanon and targeting the homes of civilians and innocents without any deterrent.
If some Lebanese consider the Washington track their reliable only path out of the current ordeal, this may stem from the conviction that Iran, even when it adds stipulations regarding Lebanon in its talks, pursues its own interests. One cannot avoid taking a moment to go over the "trilateral framework" announced in Washington to address Israel's war on Lebanon and its future course.
Large gaps in the text cannot be overlooked; nor can they be justified as a mere reflection of the current balance of power, or excused on the grounds that this is not a final agreement but only a "framework." None of that justifies the complete omission of the Armistice Agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in 1949, which led to Israel’s withdrawal from the Lebanese territories it had occupied (some 19 villages at the time, held from October 27, 1948, until the end of February 1949).
If the agreement is to be credited with anything, it is freezing the state of war and led to the liberation of Lebanese territory, which supporters of the Washington track who are indifferent to the agreement might take into consideration and use to their advantage. Despite how long it has been since it was concluded, the agreement also served as a foundation for several major political texts- most notably the Taif Agreement (1989), which ended the Lebanese war, introduced numerous reforms to the political system, and became part of the Lebanese constitution. It was likewise cited in the text of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in President Joseph Aoun's inaugural address, and in the ministerial statement of the presidency's first government, headed by Dr. Nawaf Salam.
Accordingly, this agreement cannot be ignored, even if Israel withdrew from it unilaterally after the 1967 war. It affirms recognition of Lebanon's borders and Israel’s obligation not to violate them. It also ends the war, or at least freezes it, pending the manifestation of an integrated Arab track that Lebanon cannot stand outside. Indeed, Lebanon's only option is to shelter behind an Arab position in this regard; Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Qatari, and Syrian support is essential in these difficult moments.
The absence of a timetable for Israel’s withdrawal from the villages it occupied in southern Lebanon is another major obstacle to a solution. It adds to the leverage that the Israeli army had attained through occupation, and it subjects the Lebanese army to a test it should not have to face, militarily or even symbolically. Here lies the problem of the pilot zones, which will generate friction between the Lebanese army and local residents. That is exactly what Israel wants, for the army to be left at the mercy of Israeli approval over this or that piece of territory.
On this trajectory, Israeli military withdrawal could take many years. In the meantime, Lebanon's domestic divisions will deepen, threatening perpetual unrest if not a full-scale implosion. Naturally, this climate will be reinforced by the difficulty of reconstruction, given the unresolved security and military file in the villages of the south, the continued stalling and evasiveness over withdrawal, and the lack of funds.
For all these reasons, we must reopen the national debate over future options and ways of confronting the existing challenges, and to unify domestic efforts within this framework, disregarding treason accusations on one side, and leaps of faith on the other.
