Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stressed to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that the Lebanese people, “after paying the highest price in terms of their stability and security, have chosen the state,” which has linked the twin priorities of “Israeli withdrawal and the removal of illegal weapons.”
He emphasized that “Lebanon does not want to be an arena for others’ conflicts” and that it looks forward to “a new chapter with Iran, a healthy state-to-state relationship based on mutual respect for sovereignty and independence.”
Pezeshkian’s response was striking. He focused on “the importance of resistance in the region, not only in Lebanon,” effectively treating Lebanon as a sphere of influence rather than a sovereign state.
In doing so, he appeared to reaffirm the continuity of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” through the longstanding “memorandum of understanding,” while overlooking the fact that developments from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab have rendered previous realities obsolete, and that Lebanon now negotiates on its own behalf, with no connection between the Lebanese issue and Iran’s expansionist project.
If this reflects the position of what is described as the moderate camp in Tehran, one must ask what the views are within the Revolutionary Guard, the Supreme Leader’s office, and Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters.
It is worth recalling that during the presidencies of Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, Qasem Soleimani exported Khomeini’s revolution across the region through the Quds Force and its proxies. He spearheaded plans that expanded Iranian influence across Arab states, leading to boasts of control over four Arab capitals through auxiliary armies and military, financial, and social infrastructures tied directly to the Iranian regime.
As columnist Hazem Saghieh described it, that revolution and the system it produced set a record in the destruction of countries and the loss of human lives, including those of Iranians, making it one of the region’s greatest catastrophes.
Accordingly, no priority ranks higher for the Iranian regime than protecting its Lebanese front, its weapons, and its influence, particularly after its dramatic collapse in Syria, its effective exit from Gaza, and amid the uncertain state of its influence in Iraq.
This priority views Lebanon only as a component of Iran’s regional project, even if it results in thousands more casualties, further devastation, scorched earth, forced displacement, and suffering across the country. Most alarming is the scale of the tragedy in southern Lebanon, where the entire community of Jabal Amel faces an absence of any foreseeable path toward a sustainable solution.
Iran’s approach to Lebanon mirrors its approach to the broader region and the wider world. It culminates in a dangerous intimidation around the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, potentially allowing Tehran to exert influence over the global economy.
Iran is gambling that such leverage will ultimately force the United States into a deal that would cement a strategic victory for Tehran and unleash its project across the Arab world.
This is the role assigned to the Houthi mobs in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. The nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, drones, and regional proxies are interconnected components primarily aimed at Iran’s neighbors, driven by an illusion of comprehensive domination and exclusive control of wealth.
The current deadlock in negotiations, punctuated by periodic propaganda campaigns, is being undermined by escalating attacks on global maritime chokepoints. This creates the conditions for a broader conflict that may gather momentum after November 3, regardless of the outcome of US congressional midterm elections. The danger lies in Iranian policies that have closed off avenues for sustainable solutions and accelerated a return to an unfinished war.
In that scenario, there is little reason to expect a quick end to the expanding conflict. It could reopen the door to renewed Israeli escalation in Lebanon, particularly in light of Hezbollah’s insistence, on behalf of its patrons in Tehran, on retaining its weapons and maintaining the “resistance.”
This course has brought disaster in the form of human losses, territorial damage, displacement, and harm to both the population and the environment.
Setting aside Hezbollah’s practice of branding opponents as traitors, Israel may increase both its military aggression and territorial reach in Lebanon. Reports circulating in Israel suggest the existence of plans to connect the so-called “yellow zone” to Beaufort Castle north of the Litani River and to prevent a normal return to the Nabatieh area.
The threats facing Lebanon are immediate and growing. Southern Lebanon has already witnessed ethnic cleansing that could expand further. Since the outbreak of the Gaza support war, Israel has become unwilling to tolerate a Hezbollah-supporting bloc along its border.
So beware of any reversal that would affect the essence of the trilateral “framework agreement,” because such a move could alarm the Americans and further weaken Lebanon’s position.
The “framework agreement” remains the key document underpinning Israel’s acceptance of redeploying its forces outside Lebanese territory, thereby eliminating the rationale for any so-called “yellow” or “gray” zone. Israeli withdrawal, even if gradual, was based on a fundamental equation: land in exchange for weapons, a principle Prime Minister Salam emphasized to the Iranian president.
The task now is implementation, step by step and wherever possible, beginning perhaps with Shiite villages free of Israeli occupation whose residents are calling for an end to weapons and unauthorized armed activity.
