Gaza has been neglected since the US-Israel war on Iran broke out. That neglect, a freeze in all work on the file, handed Netanyahu precious time, which he used at leisure to press on with the war on Gaza unrestrained.
Nickolay Mladenov and Tony Blair, the two most prominent faces of the Board of Peace, made moves and issued statements that served mainly as reminders that the Board still exists. Its mission has in practice shifted from ending the war and leading the day after to playing a futile mediating role between Hamas and Israel. It was in this context that Jared Kushner met Khalil al-Hayya in Egypt and dined at his table.
During this year's war with Iran, Netanyahu resumed his war on Gaza, if at a lower intensity than before Trump secured the ceasefire. The flow of agreed aid into the enclave fell sharply, and Israel expanded its occupation until it covered two-thirds of Gaza.
The American administration overlooked everything Israel did, apart from a few secondary statements issued, as the saying goes, for form's sake. This indulgence was read as the Trump administration's understanding of Netanyahu's electoral needs, needs that ran counter to the flexibility the American initiative required, an initiative Netanyahu had accepted only reluctantly.
Set aside the uses Netanyahu found for it, and look at it from the angle of the American initiative and of President Trump's need for a foreign-policy achievement, and the Gaza file is the easiest of all, and the one most objectively ripe for serious progress. It is not tied to the Iranian file, nor to Hezbollah, which this time refrained from linking its battle to support for Gaza. Logically, that should favor moving the file forward, all the more so since its principal, perhaps sole, sponsor is the US, and its principal obstacle is America's ally Netanyahu.
Other factors favor a resumption of American work on Gaza. The number of countries ready to take part in the international force charged with implementing the American initiative has grown, and that force's representatives are now on Gaza's borders. Should Netanyahu leave the scene and Eisenkot take his place, more constructive Israeli cooperation with the Board of Peace can reasonably be expected. Eisenkot has promised as much, and nothing prevents him from keeping that promise, so long as the Americans want it kept.
Meanwhile, under cover of American and international preoccupation with the war on Iran, and with its direct effects on regional security and the world economy, the West Bank endured the most sweeping campaign of abuse against its people and their property. Israel issued decisions to double settlement there and showed a readiness to displace its population and annex it, alongside an economic stranglehold without precedent since the occupation of 1967. All of this put the already slim prospects of a Palestinian state on the ground in existential danger.
Under Netanyahu, the West Bank's narrow geography filled with additional army battalions and armed settler militias, as though the occupation had been renewed, doubled, and made more ferocious. The American administration issued warnings centered on settler crimes, and there have been international boycotts of settlers and their products, still limited in scope. None of it produced tangible results that affected the positions or measures of Netanyahu's government.
Eisenkot's positions on the West Bank are not yet clear enough to build on. He has affirmed his rejection of a Palestinian state, in line with the great majority of Zionist forces in government and opposition alike. But he needs to show a real change, one convincing to the world, and its foundation lies in the West Bank. If not by accepting a Palestinian state, then by freezing the most dangerous settlement project there, E1, which would permanently cut the northern West Bank off from the south and ring occupied East Jerusalem with a wall of settlements, ending any realistic prospect of a settlement over the city.
What will Eisenkot do? Can he tame the hawks in his coalition, such as Bennett and Liberman? That will be the decisive test of his ability to bring about change and to lead Israel through it in his term.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu managed to enlist an American position that weakened the Palestinian Authority and stripped it of the benefits it had drawn from Washington. His own measures went further still, depriving it of its standing and of its credibility as the leadership of its people. His coalition partners never stopped threatening to dismantle it, after years of withholding its funds and portraying it as an entity incapable of the least of the tasks entrusted to it as national authorities, even within the narrow, low ceiling of self-rule.
Eisenkot has hinted at a more flexible approach to the Palestinian Authority should he take office. Without inflating expectations, even an improvement in how it is treated would be the least that the Palestinians, their cause, and their basic rights require. Can Eisenkot deliver even that?