Mustafa al-Kadhimi
Former Iraqi Prime Minister
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The New Levant... the Opportunity Remains

Two years ago, almost to the day, the world’s attention turned to Baghdad amid its efforts to further peace. It held an exceptional summit at an exceptional time. Overcoming deep polarization was its agenda, as my brothers and I, alongside the rulers of neighboring countries, worked tirelessly to achieve this pivotal objective for the public interest.

We wanted this conference to be a step towards resolving disputes and developing solutions founded on a shared vision of how to serve the nations of our region and replace perpetual tensions with stability and tranquility. We thus proposed economic-political-cultural projects that go beyond monetary rewards and serve the interests of our peoples in the near future.

Ideas, proposals, and projects were put forward in bilateral, tripartite and multiparty discussions. However, I believe that the “New Levant” is the most prominent among them. With tripartite economic cooperation between the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Arab Republic of Egypt as its nucleus, this initiative was a model that could appeal for the entire region. It could be replicated by others seeking to synergize and invest in their capabilities and capacities, partners from West Asia to Southeast Europe and the Arab world seeking to improve the lives of this region’s peoples.

This idea that I put a lot of into was shared by a number of interested friends about ten years ago, and we developed it together. It was a “realistic” framework for realizing our dream of cooperating around an integrated economic project that could transform our countries and turn them into prominent economic powers, if not the most powerful.

We began by assessing the capacities and capabilities afforded to us by our geography, political influence, and human capital. It is no secret that the proposal has evolved substantially after 2020, when I became Prime Minister. The conceptual foundations became more precise, as leaders became more willing to move forward with an integrated project that fills gaps and allows for overcoming differences through a vision based on cooperation and partnership.

The complicated local, regional, and international circumstances of this period compelled me to move forward, as Iraq and its surroundings were in dire need of such a similar project that could lead us out of our tunnels and trenches into the open fields of joint action and cooperation.

Since major shifts always face pushback and inevitably inspire apprehension, deep dialogue with many local and external powers were needed. Paradoxically, while some of my compatriots saw it as a threat to our economy, the brothers and neighbors of Iraq were extremely enthusiastic about this project.

Indeed, some compatriots pushed this view although it ran up against the facts and figures. It was at this moment that I got a sense that domestic Iraqi actors would be concerned about any project for regional integration that included Iraq. The perception that any regional cooperation would serve our partners at our expense had become engrained because of an accumulation of failed attempts and misconceptions.

Here, we go over our contemporary history. In the 1950s, Prime Minister Nuri al-Saeed put forward a proposal for the Hashemite Arab Federation that would unite Iraq and Jordan. The idea was founded on the vast commonalities between the two countries, their rulers, and their peoples. He did everything in his power to ensure its success despite fierce local opposition, which presented the initiative as a framework for integrating the country in the pro-American regional alliance. Domestic complications and misguided local perceptions pushed on by external forces prevented his project from materializing.

Saeed sought to make Iraq part of the system of international relations that emerged after World War II, to improve its stature and enhance its influence in the region and the world. He understood the balance of power at play during this time, and he was well aware of the capabilities and potential of Iraq, Jordan and other regional actors.

He understood the boom surrounding the country and sought to prevent Iraq from being subservient or undermined. Saeed’s lesson was right there before me. Skepticism and objection to the New Levant stems from a neurosis gripping a broad segment of the Iraqi political elite. It is not a social complex. Rather, it is mostly a political one founded on a conception of our circumstances and shifts.

In Iraq, we have a notion that entering into regional partnerships amounts to yielding to external actors whose aim is to pillage the country’s wealth and squander the future of its youths to the benefit of our partners. This neurotic notion captivates political consciousness in our region. It is shared by rulers and a broad segment of the population, treating requires a revision of our history and experiences and understanding them better. This does not imply altering them, but choosing suitable examples and building on them, avoiding polemics, and dismantling them through dialogue and patient efforts.

It is my personal conviction that this neurosis stems from an individualistic view of politics. Some look at joint projects between countries like they were a zero-sum commercial transaction between groups of individuals. This conception shared by some elites shapes their politics. They do not see the public interest from a national perspective. Instead, they approach it based on how it will affect their personal interests and the gains they have made.

This approach is evident from the governance of some of the figures who have ruled Iraq and the region. And states and nations’ freedoms cannot be built on individuals’ vision; they demand collaborative planning and a deeper understanding of history and geopolitics.

Unfortunately, those who believe in this individualistic view (and there are many of them) refuse to think like statesmen. Statements, on the other hand, unequivocally claim that making gains made through cooperation or partnership is better than missing out on them. Today, the world is rushing towards expanding cooperation and collaboration between countries. This was evident in South Africa a few days ago, with the accession of a number of countries in the region to BRICS.

Let us take another example, the experience of European countries with the United States after World War II. European countries accepted the Marshall Plan although they knew the United States was its ultimate beneficiary. European leaders were severely criticized by “Eastern” politicians, who argued that the Europeans had made a fatal error by falling into this trap. However, the European leaders of what used to be the “Western Axis” saw the project positively.

The difference in criteria was behind their divergent views. One saw the interest of the individual/ individuals as the criteria, and the others founded their view on the interest of the state (and saving it). The question is, after all these years, did the European leaders end up saving their countries by accepting this project? The answer can be discerned by looking into the degree of development that each has achieved there over the past few decades.

Let’s go back to our region and reflect on our experiences. After decades of armed and unarmed confrontations, what has become of those advocating “progressiveness?” What has the “nationalist” discourse achieved in terms of development that benefited our countries and nations? Are we to sacrifice more of our capacities and resources to deprive our children of development in favor of leaders’ desires and reassure their neurotic apprehensions? Should we develop similar discourses but with “new” terminology that increases our isolation?

The monumental advances elsewhere in the region, especially in the Arab Gulf, deserve our attention. We should congratulate them, and we are ready to integrate into these development projects, not only the Arab ones, but also those of the countries stretching from West Asia to Southeast Europe. It is thus that we would allow for economic integration that creates political balance, averts threats, accommodates differences, assures our people, and inspires hope. We must pursue this end in the spirit of dialogue, honesty and reconciliation, understanding the intertwined interests that began by establishing small blocs that became larger blocs and wield significant influence.

Over the past two years, I have been struggling to deal with the limited worldview of a substantial segment of the Iraqi political elite. Despite the difficult circumstances and challenges I faced, I continue to strive to ensure the success of this project. Indeed, I was - and I remain - confident that Iraq’s renaissance can be achieved through a regional project grounded in economic and political integration.

I was looking at the project through the lens of the state, not my person. This is how we can help Iraq and its surroundings move past our impasse. We will overcome internal crises through joint action. All we need is conviction and a vision, determination and action, and to seize opportunities and invest in them. Otherwise, history will show us no mercy.

We owe it to history. We must preserve what our ancestors have afforded us for the sake of the youths who “want a homeland” that meets their dreams in this turbulent world.