The World Economic Forum held in Riyadh last week strengthened the momentum of the ongoing negotiations. Its speakers could be heard over the sounds of the weapons fired in Gaza, and the white smoke rising from Riyadh overshadowed the black smoke over Tel Aviv. A ceasefire that leads to the release of the hostages has become a serious prospect, and more importantly, initiatives to reach a two-state solution have been revived after having been frozen even before the Gaza war broke out.
Saudi diplomacy was the driving force. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan pursued two tracks. First, he sought to ensure a permanent ceasefire between Hamas and Israel that would free the hostages. He coupled these efforts with a push for a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian question that would give rise to "a credible irreversible path" that leads to a two-state solution.
For his part, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been working on several fronts. He reiterated the statements that his administration has repeatedly made, stressing that the US wants to pave the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state that begins with ending the war in Gaza. This would be followed by the normalization of relations between Israel and the countries of the region, the "most effective rebuke to both Iran and Hamas."
These stances are significant because they reaffirm that talks that preceded the October 7th operation were serious. Indeed, one of the attack’s main objectives was undermining the efforts to build sustainable peace among the countries of the region. Another was to undermine the influence of the US in the region and strain US-Gulf relations in general, particularly US-Saudi ties, especially their cooperation on security. So far, it seems that the October 7th attack has done the opposite. Two-state solution has become a magic word for diplomats seeking to resolve the conflict. Washington has returned, and it is a key player in the effort to end the Gaza war, working alongside regional states that seek a durable peace and establishing new foundations for regional security.
Will the talks on the sidelines of the Riyadh Economic Forum bear fruit? There is no straightforward answer, as success hinges on many intertwined factors. Some are negative and may sour the atmosphere, while others are positive and give us a reason to be optimistic.
One of the encouraging factors is that Israel is now almost fully convinced that it cannot fight its adversaries alone. Indeed, it seems to have recognized that despite its military and technological supremacy in the region, it needs the support of Western allies. That was obvious when Iran retaliated to the attack on its consulate in Damascus with a flurry of drones and missiles. Additionally, Israel, or more precisely this extremist government, knows that it cannot confront most of the majority of the world’s countries, which have condemned the cruel excesses of its war on Hamas, regardless of these countries' recognition of Israel’s right to self-defense.
It is no exaggeration to say that Israel finds itself caught in a conflict with the world today. Most of the countries in the United Nations General Assembly are confronting it. After the Iranian attack, Israel was not granted the international sympathy it is used to using. Thanks to this government, Israel today is clashing with the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, which might issue arrest warrants against a number of its officials and leaders soon. We cannot ignore the tensions bordering on disputes with its main strategic ally, Washington, to say nothing about the protests against it in many prominent American and European universities. Moreover, Benjamin Netanyahu's government is in an extremely uncomfortable position domestically. Protests have filled the streets, and we see reports of Security Cabinet infighting regularly.
On the other hand, Iran is not faring any better. It is essentially a mirror image of Israel: near-isolated internationally, sanctioned on multiple levels and grounds, and a black box of discontent domestically. Tehran knows it is not immune to the threat Israel poses, The latter has shown it could target Iran’s nuclear facilities in Isfahan. Israel’s attack came after a long list of successful assassinations and sabotage attacks it launched within and outside Iran, as well as its many attacks on Iran’s allies in Syria over the years.
Since October 7th, Israel can no longer defy the entire world. It has been prohibited from launching attacks on Iran without the consent and support of Washington. Iran, too, is incapable of fighting Israel directly. It can only do so through asymmetric warfare via its proxies in the region. Iran is within range of Israeli missiles and those of its Western allies, and it knows that the West would not leave Israel to fend for itself if Iran were to attack it.
In conclusion, Tehran and Tel Aviv have been forbidden from going to war. They are not allowed to go beyond the current state limbo, which has begun to lose steam. The world as a whole refuses to remain silent about the killing of Palestinians in Gaza, and the Iranians have realized the limits of what their expansion through proxies and allies can offer.
Will this state of affairs convince the hardliners in both Israel and Iran to adapt to the developments and change? Or will it encourage escalation?
They are two main players behind the crisis in the region, albeit to varying and debatable extents. Iran knows its limitations, and Israel has been reined in by its allies. Since the war in Gaza, US diplomacy has taken the unusual step of maintaining mutual deterrence. The question remains whether this Western mutual deterrence can prevent a fully-fledged regional war, give rise to a comprehensive peace process, and impose it, at least on Israel, pending developments in Tehran.
The region is almost ready for settlement if Israel (and I don't mean this government specifically) can get over its obsession with military solutions and shift look at matters from a political lens. Netanyahu is struggling to invade Rafah and expand the war into southern Lebanon amid increasing pressure. He is caught between the options of either Biden on one side and Ben-Gvir and Smotrich on the other, while protests surround him from all sides.
Iran is not looking for a fully-fledged war it cannot afford. It fears nothing more than a strategic shift in the region’s security architecture precipitated by a Saudi-American military cooperation agreement and the pursuit of a two-state solution and durable Arab-Israeli peace proves successful.
Remaining obstinate in the face of these developments will prove difficult for Israel. Netanyahu will probably not remain in office for much longer, paving the way for a government that understands the new dynamics in the region and the world. Crucially, they understand how they should deal with Israel's neighbors and its strategic ally, the United States.
The standards and criteria of the past are no longer suitable for understanding the direction that the region is heading in. The whole world has been swept by anticipation for a settlement that includes all the influential parties in the region except for Iran. If the small-scale wars continue for much longer, they will certainly spark an explosion, which is the last thing this troubled region needs.
