Sam Menassa
TT

From Kidnapped Hostages to a Kidnapped Region

Benjamin Netanyahu was not content with kidnapping Israel itself, Palestine, Lebanon, and perhaps Syria. He has decided to take the entire region hostage before finishing the Gaza war and drag it to the place it wants to avoid. No one following regional developments a year ago, and no experts in the region could have imagined Israel going as far as hitting the heart of Tehran and managing to assassinate a high-ranking Palestinian figure. Israel has carried out numerous assassinations and acts of sabotage in Iran. However, this operation is different because it is another step toward escalation that was taken in Iran. Hamas and its leaders within Palestine, Lebanon, or Syria are no longer the only targets.
Seven hours before the assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, Israel killed one of Hezbollah's most prominent figures in the heart of Beirut's southern suburbs, Fuad Shukr, who had played a pivotal role in planning the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Months earlier, Israel assassinated a Hamas leader, Saleh al-Arouri, in the same area.
It is difficult to ignore the timing and nature of this escalation, though it was to be expected after Netanyahu's speech in Congress. The loud applause Netanyahu received did not conceal his intentions. Indeed, he explicitly stated that there would be no negotiations or truce, insisting on Israel’s determination to eliminate Hamas and continue the war against what he called the "Axis of Terrorism" led by Iran. He argued that Israel was fighting in defense of the West in entirety and that the enemies of the US are Israel's enemies, stressing that their battle is one and the same and that by supporting Israel, the US is supporting itself!
Netanyahu returned from Washington determined to escalate before the end of President Joe Biden's term, for two main reasons that complement each other. First, Netanyahu understands that former President Donald Trump wants to avoid wars during his term, meaning that Netanyahu needs to finish his wars before Trump’s return to the White House. Second, a Harris victory seems increasingly likely following the unprecedentedly swifty surge in momentum her replacement of Biden managed to generate, rescuing the party from its disarray.
Of course, Harris's stance on Israel-Palestine differs from Trump's, and her views are not totally aligned with Biden’s either. Netanyahu might find dealing with her more challenging than dealing with Trump or Biden. Moreover, despite the warm reception he received in Congress, his bilateral meetings, as well as the reactions of the general public, have demonstrated that far from everyone across the US political spectrum was united in welcoming him.
Netanyahu left no room for doubt about his intentions to continue and expand the war and confront Iran. He believes that doing so will benefit him politically and personally, rescuing him from the turmoil in Israel and an inflamed, divided, and angry Israeli public. The Israelis are not happy with their prime minister’s decision to prioritize military action and the destruction of "Hamas" over the safety and return of the hostages. Nonetheless, Netanyahu is aware that Israel cannot wage such a war without Washington, and that neither the ardent Zionists around Trump nor the far-left liberals around Biden and Harris support direct US intervention. Therefore, he is trying to drag the US into this against its will.
Unless Netanyahu takes his recklessness to unexpected heights, posing a real threat to its interests, Washington will not be dragged into this war, regardless of the intensity of the pressure to do so. Netanyahu is an extremely cunning and ruthless operator who places his own interests above those of his country. He is not constrained by the price that will be by the innocent victims on any side, and the fear is that he could take impulsive actions out of desperation and frustration. He has already undermined the negotiations in Rome, and he has changed the rules of engagement with Hezbollah and Iran with his assassination of Haniyeh and Shukr and his strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs.
On the other hand, Iran also does not want to fight a war directly. It prefers smaller, containable proxy wars like those being waged in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, by the Houthis in Yemen, and by allied militias in Iraq. The problem is that Israel is escalating further on a daily basis, and Hezbollah cannot avoid retaliating to Israel’s near-daily attacks. Nor Iran, which has sought to maintain strategic patience, and absorb provocations and blatant violations of its sovereignty. Caught between retaliation and counter-retaliation, the region stands over an active volcano.
After the October 7th operation, going back to the previous status quo is no longer conceivable- neither for the general Israeli public nor the Netanyahu government or his entourage. If the Israelis succeed in militarily defeating Hamas in Gaza, they will not stand idly by and leave Hezbollah alone in Lebanon. The solutions that had been put forward by the Americans and the West in the past, such as the implementation of a revised version of Resolution 1701, are no longer acceptable. Military action is Netanyahu’s only way out, meaning that the violence will continue to worsen. Since a direct war between Israel and Iran is not on the card without US involvement, Lebanon, and possibly part of Syria, will likely become the theaters of this alternative war, which is the only option Netanyahu has for prolonging the conflict.
The kind of Israeli comprehensive political settlement with Hezbollah that could avert the worst in Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel, that is, a deal between the US, Iran, and Israel, is not possible under the leadership of Netanyahu. It is definitely not possible with this unrestrained version of Netanyahu at the helm.