Why China Changed and Iran is Not Changing

If we set aside the vastly disparate geographic, political, and economic scales of the two countries, we can ask the following question:
How can we explain China’s relative success at breaking the shackles of ideology, allowing it to reinvent itself and turn into an economic and political power with a "capitalist body and a communist head" on the one hand, and on the other hand, Iran continuing to drown in ideological rigidity that makes fundamental change a dangerous step that would undoubtedly become a prelude for its collapse?
For centuries, China presented the world with a remarkable pragmatic governance model. It constantly adapted and changed without its strong central authority, which has always prioritized continuity and survival, ever losing its grip on the country. A slogan coined by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping as his country undertook economic reforms in 1978, with which China’s "redefinition" of communism began, encapsulates an approach that defines the character of the state in China. "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice," launched a complicated journey through which the Communist Party’s iron grip on power was maintained even as China adopted a market economy.
Moreover, China benefited from the legacy of Confucianism throughout its history. Core Confucian values emphasize order, hierarchy, and the primacy of the state, reinforcing a culture of pragmatic governance in China. This cultural backdrop made it easier for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to present economic reforms as necessary for the survival of the state and to frame the adoption of capitalism as nothing more than a means to achieve the ultimate goal of socialism, which is prosperity for all.
In contrast to the consistency of the state’s character in the Chinese experience, we find deep ruptures and volatility in Iran. The Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979 was not just a major political event, it also profoundly reconfigured Iranian society. Khomeinism fused religion and sectarianism into politics and glued it to revolutionary zeal and a political system that claims a divine mandate. Any deviation from this path is seen as a betrayal of the divine, and the state is not merely a political entity in Iran but an earthly embodiment of celestial transcendental notions.
This conception of the state has undermined Iran’s capacity to make pragmatic changes like those we have seen in China. Calling for economic or social reform in Iran is not only seen as a political threat but also as a spiritual threat, which makes advocating for change akin to blasphemy.
While it may be true that, on the surface, the Chinese Communist Party’s centralized control over society resembles that of the Iranian Vilayet-i-Faqih political system, Iran’s political system is more complex and fragile. Religious elements of the Iranian regime coexist with republican and militaristic elements, creating a delicate balance that renders any attempt at reform a risky endeavor.
More importantly, the Chinese experience, unlike Iran’s, has been an economic success. This economic progress has provided the Communist Party with a new source of legitimacy and allowed it to neutralize opponents and impose a contradictory model (a capitalist economy under communist rule) without compromising China’s national identity or paying a high price for ideological impurity.
While both China and Iran harbor are deeply apprehensive about external threats, their reactions have been radically different. China built its status and resilience to foreign influence on economic growth and the modernization of its military. It has used nationalism and economic success to unify the country without having to fear the repercussions of the many deep structural changes that have accumulated since 1978. In contrast, the Iranian leadership has used notions of the threats posed by foreign actors, particularly the United States and its allies, to justify its rigid ideological positions and resistance to change. The regime is haunted by fears that any ideological recalibration could potentially undermine Iran's ability to resist foreign influence and precipitate the collapse of the revolutionary state.
Chinese communism has proven adaptive. It has managed to evolve in response to changing circumstances while maintaining the Communist Party’s authority. China has leveraged its strategic significance to build balanced relationships with its adversaries, by building bridges and maintaining both its distinctiveness and capacity to compete. As for Iran’s religious ideology, it is deeply rooted in the state’s volatile identity, and it sees any fundamental change as a threat to the fabric of the Iranian Revolution that could bring down the regime.
It is worth noting that China began to change the year that the Iranian Revolution was born, 1978, after the Chinese Communist Party had ruled the country since the fall of 1949. So, is there still time for Iran to change course? Taking the route of reform is not merely challenging for Iran, it is an existential threat. Indeed, the survival of the regime requires maintaining ideological purity, even as Iran becomes increasingly isolated from the international community, continues to squander its economic potential, and shows no capacity to adapt.
Today, Iran seems more likely to go down the road of the Soviet Union than to replicate China’s trajectory, as former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has noted. Like Soviet Russia, Khomeinist Iran is being weighed down by ideological rigidity and corruption. Its regime has also alienated society, and it may ultimately seal its own fate as the Soviet Union had.