Last week, global and regional media outlets focused on President Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. Some of the piles of analysis we saw were objective and fact-based; others were fanciful and prejudiced.
Some theories have now been shown to be misguided. One is the theory that the United States has pivoted to China and South Asia, abandoning the Middle East. Trump’s first state visit proved the exact opposite: under the new administration, the United States sees the Middle East, particularly the Gulf capitals, as central to its interests. In fact, Middle Eastern issues have also become a focal point for Europe.
Most of the Middle East's problems, though not all of them, have emerged around the past half-century, following the pursuit of “exporting the revolution” by the revolutionary government in Iran that had come to power in the early 1980s.
“Exporting the revolution” has taken various forms. Initially, it was an attempt to incite Arab communities around Iran to overthrow their regimes. However, the conditions in pre-revolution Iran were different from those of Arab countries. The Iranian revolution began to look for allies, and it found them in two places: first, among certain segments of society that shared its revolutionary sectarian ideology, and second, in the Palestinian cause.
Iran could not go very far with the first group because the economic and social conditions in their countries were not conducive to toppling their regimes. Moreover, not all members of these sects were loyal to Iran, as the many services provided by Arab states had not been provided to most Iranian communities, neither before nor after the revolution.
Iran once again sought to find allies through the Palestinian cause, given the enormous sentimental weight that Palestine carries among Arabs. It initially experimented with Fatah, eventually falling out with the movement and finding what it had been looking for in Hamas, which Iran probably instructed to carry out the attack of October 7, 2023, according to a Financial Times report published on June 13. Hamas launched the operation assuming that Iran’s axis would be ready to provide support.
Under the broad banner of “liberating Palestine,” Iran also succeeded in recruiting a significant segment of the Lebanese population to join Hezbollah.
Having long claimed that Iran had had the power to erase Israel within hours, if not less, through its immense propaganda networks, the Iranian axis presented all the actions taken by these factions, which hurt other communities in their own countries, as sacrifices for Palestine.
After October 7, 2023, this ground unpinning this assumption broke: Gaza became uninhabitable, Hezbollah was diminished, and Syria ultimately left the axis.
To make matters worse, the two direct clashes between Israel and Iran exposed the limitations of Iran’s military capabilities, both in terms of equipment and firepower. For the first time, Iran’s own security took a hit.
There was a strong wave of opposition to Iran’s growing influence. Iran had expended considerable effort and money to spread instability in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab region, creating resentment in a number of Arab states.
In the lead-up to Trump’s visit, the drums of war had been growing louder. Meanwhile, Iranian officials engaged in shuttle diplomacy to Gulf capitals. Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman also delivered a message to the Iranian leadership: “We in this region do not want a war between any two parties.” Wars are destructive and do not serve any regional power’s interest. De-escalation was the goal, and the Kingdom succeeded.
During Trump’s visit, he was told that war would be unacceptable. Along with his own desire for peace, these warnings were pushed to backtrack. The US armada that had been mobilized to the region withdrew. One key question remained: Did Iran get the message? Had Iran understood that its neighbors are growing weary of its interference in their domestic affairs, and that it would be better for everyone, including Iran, if it abandoned that irrational slogan of “exporting the revolution.”
The Iranian people have every right to live as they wish, but so do others. The model that the Iranian revolution established does not appeal to its neighbors, who have begun to build a different model of their own, and they have already made strides.
The question is: Has scaling back the threat of war shown Iran that the path it has taken over the past five decades is a dead end and that a durable peace - one that enables economic, social, and political development and meets the aspirations of our societies - would be better for both Iranians and their neighbors? Or will it prefer returning to the past once again?
The Iranian leadership has the right to present the results it has achieved so far in whatever way it finds satisfactory. What truly matters is not how the results are sold domestically, but whether there is a shift in Iran’s compass. Will it turn away from its regional ambitions and focus on achieving domestic objectives that fuel development and improve the well-being of Iranians?
The coming days and weeks will show us the direction Iran has chosen to take. The ultimate indicator will be whether Iran reaches an agreement with the United States regarding its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and its regional interventions. Will there be a change on these three fronts, or will things remain the same? Indeed, even if war is avoided, a severe blockade could be imposed, and it would have even more bitter implications for the Iranian people.
Solving this dilemma is the bridge between Trump’s visit to the region and his departure. Everyone is awaiting the answer in this region that has already suffered, far more than it deserves to, from populist sloganeering that has exhausted its people and paralyzed its development.
To conclude, every society that has been infected by the Iranian “virus” has unfortunately experienced state failure, currency collapse, and the spread of poverty.
