When General Joseph Aoun was elected President of the Lebanese Republic and Judge Nawaf Salam was named Prime Minister, both developments seemed engulfed in a revolutionary climate. There was a popular mobility expressing itself in all kinds of ways that reflected a broadly shared desire to break with the “ancien regime” that brought the country misery, with its calamities culminating in a catastrophic war and occupation. As a result, ideas- around the role of the state, rejecting violence and war, and striving toward a new vision for Lebanon- that had long been suppressed exploded onto the surface.
However, the people in charge have chosen to defuse this revolutionary climate and allowed a return to business as usual. Accordingly, all that remains of this climate are two documents, which, in the end, are official statements: the president’s inaugural address and the government’s ministerial statement.
However, what we have seen in the (relatively long) interim, suggests that these texts were never meant to be implemented, only to signal positive intent.
True, the new cabinet includes competent and respected ministers who have tackled some reforms in an acceptable manner. However, all of that addresses outcomes more than it does causes, with the latter deemed deferrable to a day in the future that may never come.
There might be many reasons behind the decision not to take the initiative and deal with the fundamentals: fear of armed clashes that would threaten Lebanon’s presumed civic peace, the embarrassment some feel about the fact that the new political situation emerged as the result of the war Israel had waged on the country and their discomfort with seeming like they are finishing the job that the Jewish state had started, or an attachment to what remains of the “alliance of minorities” theory, especially in light of the recent shift in Syria and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s authority. Another possible reason is that the ruling parties have agreed to leave addressing these matters until after the negotiations between Iran and the US run their course, in the hope that these issues will resolve themselves without the need for intervention. However, this approach risks an ill-fated reiteration of the Chehabist presidency that grew out of an understanding between the US and Egypt.
Whatever their considerations, the authorities seem determined to resolve an extremely exceptional situation through extremely conventional means. Here, we find a substantial dose of irrationality that assumes (albeit without saying so) that Lebanon, the weaker party in this equation, is the one in control. While the president’s inaugural address and the ministerial statement cry for implementation, the authorities have persistently called for addressing Hezbollah’s weapons through “dialogue,” without managing to compel the party to clearly and unequivocally commit to giving its weapons up following Israel’s withdrawal. Moreover, a number of the president’s appointments suggest that he is applying the “no victor, no vanquished” theory, another parallel with the 1958 compromise.
For their part, regional and international actors have, with a shared sense of urgency, been pushing Lebanon to take the initiative. It has become clear that the wily cunning the Lebanese are famous for will not convince the world to “make allowances” without an answer to the question of the state’s monopoly on arms. Meanwhile, there is a growing conviction that moving slowly has stalled progress on all fronts amid crushing economic hardship and diminishing hope in a successful summer season. Most critically, Israel’s aggression and its interpretation of the ceasefire have imposed sharp polarization that is squeezing the middle of the road that Lebanon’s leaders have sought to occupy. Finally, there came the painful strike on Beirut’s southern suburb- a humiliating attack that, if it was not a sign that the war would resume, warned of similar strikes becoming a way of life. The state, in turn, could do nothing more than condemn the attack “in the strongest terms” and denounce the “cover for it provided by America”. As for the threat to “suspend cooperation” with the committee monitoring the cessation of hostilities, this sulking will probably have no impact after all balances of power had collapsed. While some have said that Israel is the one implementing the president’s speech and the ministerial statement, with iron and fire, Lebanon’s despair was apparent as the world paid no attention to the last assault, reaffirming that its objections to Israel’s conduct are reserved solely for the genocide in Gaza.
Will Lebanon transition to a way of life shaped by strikes Israel carries out whenever it sees fit? Or will the country ultimately opt for a painful surgical operation the rulers of Lebanon who are seeking safe passage- possibly to nowhere- may not survive?
What we can say with certainty, in any case, is that ending the current state of affairs must be prioritized. Nothing would do more to achieve this than acting on the victory attained by the principle of a state monopoly on arms, instead of obscuring or circumventing it through talk of national unity and ensuring that no side is victorious nor vanquished.
This principle does not call for celebration or triumphalism. However, disregarding it will lead to sorrow and despair that Israel alone decides to inflict on us. This principle will leave Lebanon's national identity with fresh and visible fractures on top of the latent ones. This outcome, painful enough as it is, has been made inevitable by Lebanon’s current political and sectarian alignments, which stubbornly refuse to reflect, reconsider, or learn from past bitter experiences. In the final analysis, fracturing Lebanese nationalism remains less harmful than fracturing the Lebanese nation itself in ways that would render the country itself untenable.
