Can Lebanon become a normal state again, one that can make its decisions through its state institutions and that respects its commitments in line with international laws? Can Hezbollah acknowledge that the “Axis of Resistance” is no more and that it has no choice but to return to Lebanon and close the chapter of the “regional player”? Can the party agree to a lesser role for Lebanon if Iran agrees to a lesser role in the region in recognition of the new balance of power?
It doesn’t take a genius to recognize that the situation in Lebanon has not changed, even though the features of this new reality have yet to be fully formed. Joseph Aoun was sworn in as president with Arab and international backing and under the slogan of reclaiming the state with all of its institutions. Nawaf Salam was named prime minister with the same goals.
It was evident that Lebanon will not enjoy regional and international support for its reconstruction unless the decisions that are carried out in the South are restored to the state alone.
I recalled what an Arab politician once told me. He said the Axis of Resistance is based on three pillars: The first is General Qassem Soleimani and his unique position in the Iranian supreme leader’s circle and role in exporting the revolution that is enshrined in the Iranian constitution.
The second is Hassan Nasrallah, who was Soleimani’s partner in building the Axis in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and of course, Lebanon. The third is Syria, which acted as the supply route for arms, “advisors”, and funds from Tehran to Beirut, passing through Iraq.
What is left of Hezbollah regional role now that Soleimani and Nasrallah are dead and the Syrian “bridge” has been severed with Bashar al-Assad's ouster?
The politician said Hezbollah is undoubtedly going through the most difficult phase since its establishment in wake of the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. Nasrallah and Soleimani are no more and Syria’s Sharaa has not forgotten what they have done in Syria to keep Assad’s regime alive. Tehran itself has suffered from Israeli jets breaching its skies. There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought fiercely, but there can be no denying Israel’s superiority and how it succeeded in eliminating the pillars of the Axis.
This reality prompted Aoun to dare to declare the facts as they are after he realized that Lebanon is at risk of more Israeli violations and that it will not get out from under the rubble without paying a price: Hezbollah and its weapons. So, he openly declared what his predecessors had avoided saying explicitly: the possession of weapons should be restricted to the army and Hezbollah must disarm.
Hezbollah is obviously having a hard time accepting this demand, which is effectively calling on it to abandon its regional exploits and become a local party that does not monopolize the decision of war and peace and has no military arsenal. In other words, it no longer has the right to name presidents and veto any Lebanese decision that do not align with its regional vision.
In early summer 2004, I held a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with discussions focusing on the US invasion of Iraq and its impact on the region. I had to ask about Lebanon, where Syrian troops were deployed throughout its territories and where Syria had sway over its decisions. The country was then ruled by President Emile Lahoud. Assad said that his term would end in the fall. I asked him about the rumors that the term would be extended, to which he replied: “Wasn’t the extension of Elias Hrawi’s term costly?” I agreed, and Assad added: “Don’t you think Lahoud’s extension will be even more costly?” And I had to agree.
Assad revealed that he had a list of possible presidential candidates, including Jean Obeid, whom he said was skilled at politics, but wouldn’t be a match to Rafik Hariri. I asked him who his preferred candidate was to which he tried to imply that the Lebanese themselves will decide in the end. I told him that I wasn’t some ignorant stranger and that I knew how things worked in Lebanon. At my insistence, Assad told me he favored Suleiman Franjieh, whom he praised.
In the end, Lahoud’s term was extended and Franjieh was ruled out as a candidate, perhaps because he was a family friend of the Assads. I returned to Syria that fall and asked Assad about what prompted the extension, to which he replied that a “friend” advised him that Franjieh needed to forge more foreign relations, especially in the region. Franjieh would later reveal to me that the “friend” was none other than Nasrallah, who urged Assad to extend Lahoud’s term, a decision that would be costly for Syria after Hariri’s assassination.
Hezbollah made presidents and governments in Lebanon. It kept the presidential palace vacant for two and half years so that it would be able to elect Michel Aoun as president, putting him at odds with parliament Speaker Nabih Berri from day one of his term.
Can a party that used to change Assad’s decisions and that sent advisors to Yemen and Iraq return to the Lebanese map without its rockets? Will the party assume the responsibility of the isolation that will befall Lebanon if it insists on hanging on to its arsenal or if it sparks a new Israeli war on Lebanon?
The party lost its strong leader, its influence in Syria and ability to fight Israel, so what role does its arsenal have left to play? Can it take the decision to lay down its arms?
