Ahmad Mahmoud Ajaj
TT

Trump and Putin: History, Strategy, and Interests 

There is a broad impression that Trump admires Putin and always finds excuses for him. Those who share this conviction point to his denial of his own intelligence services’ conclusion that Russia interfered in the presidential elections, siding with Putin instead; his failure to follow through on his threat to impose sanctions he had planned to impose; and his decision reward Putin with a summit in Alaska, not to mention his high praise for the Russian president and, most notably, his famous humiliation of Zelenskyy at the White House.

Trump wants his name to go down in history. He constantly reiterates that he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for having halted six wars in Africa and Asia, leaving only Ukraine unresolved.

Observers agree that Trump is absolutely convinced that he is the ultimate dealmaker - that there is no problem he can’t solve. Accordingly, he is pulling the levers of the most powerful country in the world to resolve the Ukrainian conflict, regardless of his allies’ interests or security. No one in his administration dares to oppose him for fear they would be fired.

Putin, on the other hand, is obsessed with history and Russia’s glory. He can draw from a long career in intelligence and vast experience in international relations, as he propagates a narrative of victimhood, firmly convinced that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.”

He began his journey to address this “calamity” by occupying Chechnya. He then invaded Georgia and annexed some of its territory, and finally marched to the Ukrainian capital Kyiv before retreating from the Ukrainian resistance and its NATO-supplied weapons. No matter the obstacles, Putin’s defiance persists; he is striving to follow in the footsteps of Peter the Great, who built the Russian Empire, and Stalin, the founder of the Soviet Union. He does not see himself as any less great or resolute a leader.

These are the two frameworks through which Trump and Putin’s conceive of the world: their views of history and their respective strategies. Putin has devoted himself to expanding Russia’s borders, and he will not end his war in Ukraine without a treaty that forces the latter back into the lap of Mother Russia.

Throughout his time in power, he sought to strengthen his military, modernize Russia’s weapons of mass destruction, and has pursued the “near abroad” strategy - that is he has sought to consolidate Russia’s sphere of influence by forcing neighboring states to become part of its orbit. He also restored Russia’s international status, intervening in conflicts in Africa and the Middle East and reinvigorating ties with Latin American countries hostile to the United States.

Since he has nuclear weapons and is not averse to risk, George W. Bush did not dare arm Georgia’s government, fearing Putin would topple it and ignite a world war. Obama, for his part, went so far as to ask then-President Medvedev to inform Putin that the US would be more flexible after his reelection.

Putin currently sees his friendliest American counterpart in Trump, who is domestically strong and resentful of Zelenskyy for refusing to help him incriminate the son of his rival, President Biden. Trump scolded Zelenskyy: “You have no cards,” insisting that he strike a deal with Putin before the US loses its patience.

Trump wants a deal, even an unfair deal. His goal is to close the chapter of the Ukraine war, receive a Nobel Prize, and pull Russia from China’s orbit. He knows that the American hard right culturally identifies with Russia and that US businessmen are keen on investing in Russia’s resources, particularly the rare minerals that are crucial for several key American industries. For Trump, there are only immediate interests. He does not value historical alliances because he sees the world through the lens of bilateral relations. Indeed, his vision of the world has no room for democratic values or promoting them, only gains and losses.

Putin has capitalized on this mindset strategically, driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. That is why, in his remarks after the Alaska summit, he stressed Russia’s historical ties with the US, investment opportunities, his respect for Trump, and his fear that Europe would sabotage the progress they had made. Putin is well aware that the US and Europe share a strong bond, but he does not despair. At the very least, he buys time - though Trump’s impatience must also be considered, which is why he lavished praise on Trump’s negotiating skills and patience.

Putin has carved his name into Russia’s history since becoming president, while Trump dreams of a Nobel Peace Prize. The difference between the two men is that Trump thinks of himself first, putting his personal glory ahead of his country’s reputation and the interests of its allies, whereas Putin is driven by his desire to shape his country’s history. Trump wants the prize; Putin wants Russia to rise.

Putin fears Trump’s caprice and volatile character, as well as Europe’s shrewdness and capacities, and Trump knows that Europe is standing between him and his prize. Putin knows Europe is the obstacle to winning Trump over, as Europe sees a Russian victory in Ukraine as a grave threat to its security and the credibility of its union. So long as it can diplomatically stand in his way and build its own military capacity, Putin will remain diplomatically flexible with Trump. He will keep listening to him as he spars with Europe and seeks to seize additional Ukrainian territory.

The Alaska Summit exposed Trump's affection for Putin, and it underscored that he is seeking a quick resolution to the Ukrainian crisis. Indeed, the conflict has consumed much of his attention, and his reputation as a peacemaker now hinges on whether he can end it. It also showed, however, that there can be no settlement without Europe. The talks now revolve exclusively around interests and spoils, offering a lesson to anyone willing to learn: power and alliances are the guarantees, not international law.