It is now indisputable that Lebanon is no longer part of Iran’s sphere of influence. This exit is among the most prominent outcomes of the wars unfolding across the region that began on October 7, 2023, with the Gaza War and included a 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel. Most importantly, of course, it also encompassed the war on Lebanon that turned the tables on several levels.
While the country has yet to develop all of the capacities needed to complete the picture, hindering the country’s immediate shift from one sphere to another, this is a political moment and opportunity to be seized. Revitalizing a long-delayed state-building project is now possible, and the government is finally in a position to implement its own decisions and, most importantly, to impose the state’s sovereignty over the entire country without sharing jurisdiction with any local or foreign partner.
Yes, the government decision to establish a state monopoly on arms was the logical outcome of the recent war’s trajectory. However, one must not forget that this monopoly is a fundamental pillar of statehood. In Lebanon, this principle was explicitly endorsed by the Lebanese National Reconciliation Document (the Taif Agreement) that was ratified in 1989 but has only partially been implemented.
If the debate over the state’s monopolization of armament must be settled, for the reasons laid out above- and since the time has indeed come- the country’s people and officials must develop and discuss the framework and strategy for safeguarding Lebanon’s independence, ensuring Israel’s withdrawal, and putting an end to Israel’s daily assaults on the country’s sovereignty.
Moreover, if the powers keen on flipping Lebanon’s balance of power fail to bolster its national army and provide the political cover needed to shield its territory from Israel’s constant violations of its sovereignty the Lebanese state will lose its authority and the current state of affairs will not change- indeed, it could even worsen.
No one expects the West to arm the Lebanese army with the weapons needed to confront Israel, nor does anyone expect a rupture between the West, especially not the United States, and its historic ally, Israel. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore Israel’s ongoing violations of the ceasefire (signed in late November 2024) with regular attacks on Lebanese land, sea, and airspace.
It is also now evident that the 100,000 rockets Hezbollah had bragged about failed to make a difference, nor did the 100,000 fighters that Hezbollah’s late former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah once brandished to threaten both domestic and foreign audiences. The party’s failures make building new mechanisms for managing this conflict all the more pressing and necessary. The first step is rallying around the state. Many complain about its weaknesses, and that is understandable. However, there is no alternative. No other path can lead Lebanon to a new era that breaks with the past.
This is a time for intra-Lebanese dialogue on how to approach and handle this transition that turns dependence on foreign actors into a thing of the past. Indeed, that approach has collapsed spectacularly. Exclusionary politics must also be abandoned, as they only generate resentment among Lebanese and deepen schisms.
Seeking a formula for reinforcing Lebanon’s cohesion and domestic unity is the answer. In doing so, Lebanon would give itself a chance to reclaim its natural place in the region, to become a forward bastion of culture, the arts, and ideas once again. Making use of its capacities to serve a national project is the answer. The state must lead alone and lay the foundations for the new era that the Lebanese people seek.
