In Beirut, the next phase is no longer shrouded in secrecy. The question is no longer whether a new war will erupt but when? Everyone is asking “Emta el-harb,” (when’s the war in colloquial Lebanese. The question is “trending” on social media as part of a dangerous game to fragment Lebanon. At a time when the country is highly vulnerable to domestic collapse and foreign hostility, US Envoy Tom Barrack has now become part of the problem, placing himself at the center of the Lebanese people’s questions and crisis.
Before Barrack’s statements and tweets, and before the speeches of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the torrent of officials’ (whether at home or abroad) statements about sovereignty, reform, monopoly of arms, civil peace, coexistence, development, economy, reconstruction... had fallen on deaf ears. Neither Lebanese nor their friends abroad take them seriously. The truth is that the Lebanese Republic, as a state and as a people, has reached an impasse that only divine intervention could break. Meanwhile, the foreign actors have either given up or decided to apply diplomatic pressure.
Or perhaps, as some reports suggest, Ambassador Barrack will be removed from his post in Lebanon within the month, and managing Lebanon could become the job of the National Security Council in Washington as the (ceasefire monitoring) “Mechanism” committee takes on a broader role, granting the military a bigger role and allowing Morgan Ortagus to return to her position in Lebanon.
Regardless of whether Barrack’s departure is indeed imminent, his recent remarks about the arms of Hezbollah, Iran, and the Lebanese state’s failure to enforce its own decisions reflected the conclusion that the Americans have reached: betting on the state is no longer tenable. Barrack came close to explicitly saying that chemotherapy is the only remedy on the table. The implications are evident: Tel Aviv should do what the Lebanese state cannot do, neither by force nor by consensus.
In effect, Barrack blew up the safety valves the Lebanese had been relying on. His latest ambiguous tweet about supporting Lebanon’s efforts, state-building, and peace with its neighbors did not compensate. Lebanon, which is already deadlocked, has failed to engage in constructive dialogue with its “new” Syrian neighbor and resolve the grievances of the past; how could we expect it to find a way to negotiate with the enemy? Washington, which is fully behind Tel Aviv's positions, has cornered official Lebanon by refusing to exert any pressure on Tel Aviv. On the contrary, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is demanding a copy of the Lebanese army’s report on the government’s plan to seize Hezbollah’s arms- a request which raises fears that Washington and Tel Aviv could escalate if they are not convinced by the army’s report, and the worst is yet to come.
For his part, Sheikh Naim Qassem is also part of this trajectory. When he publicly proposed reconciliation with Riyadh, he was sending messages to local and foreign forces, signaling that the party has recovered and stands ready to press on. Its claim to have swiftly recuperated was also a threat to local actors: no one should think of approaching our arsenal weapons. On the surface, it was warning Tel Aviv: the party is back on its feet, and it is ready for anything. To the Arab states, Qassem signaled that a Hezbollah comeback could be part of a new framework imposed by the assault on Doha. All of these questions hinge on domestic and foreign considerations, not just the whims of Naim Qassem.
Thus, between Barrack the businessman, who seeks a settlement that is no longer within reach, Sheikh Naim Qassem, who is boasting of his party’s recovery, and Tel Aviv, which believes that pragmatism rooted in economic gain undercuts to its schemes (and poses a threat that cannot be allowed to fester) the worst yet to come.
