Is there a Palestinian, or Arab, conception of Israel that we can look to for guidance in the future? Could such a notion keep pace with the diplomatic efforts currently underway?
Two theories currently seem to dominate the discourse, especially in Lebanon: the first revolves around Israel as "the enemy," and the second keenly seeks an Israel of "deliverance."
The theory of "the enemy" currently feeds on the genocidal war waged on Gaza and the acrid resentment this war has aroused, but it had been conceived decades before the genocide.
The case for the theory of Israel "the enemy" seemingly suffers from several other problems: it is absolute, while politics and the relationships it creates are relative and fluid. Accordingly, it offers the future nothing but the same proposals that had been offered and yielded nothing but defeats and calamities.
While it is once again "promising" to "fight," this "promise" has hit the hard wall of reality: the current military and social balance of power makes following through on this promise impossible for the foreseeable future. Moreover, being consumed by hostility poisons the soul and leaves us predisposed to chronic illnesses. It also facilitates the task of any actor seeking to exploit the "opportunity" to fight "the enemy" and render it an opportunity to deceive their popular base, while tyrannizing and subjugating the broader population. That is some of what a century of history and countless tragic episodes suggest.
Furthermore, the theory that revolves around the view of Israel as "the enemy" obstructs the path of our societies to much of what they need in this world - needs that go beyond economic development, notably the "reconstruction" that Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon implore.
Therefore, it would be wise to leave this theory behind. It falsifies the hard fact of Israel’s existence on our border, and no one has the luxury of denying this tangible reality and accepting the notion that this existence is merely a pretense, nor to see its existence as reversible, especially when this characterization applies more to the societies and countries of the Levant than it does to any others. That much can be said before mentioning the place that the Jewish state has carved out for itself in our societies - an influential place, arguably, especially within communities that have been besieged by a history of injustice and civil strife, or pushed to the margins, as a provider of material, or at the very least moral, relief.
However, the theory that revolves around Israel as "the deliverer" entails just as much wishful thinking as the first theory, even if the current international and regional diplomatic climate seems, at first glance, to validate it.
To preach peace and normalization with Israel "right now, not tomorrow" is, and will indefinitely remain, to circuitously preach for domestic supremacy and empowering one community against all the others. Even if we were to set the genocidal war in Gaza aside, choosing not to consider a pressing issue for our politics, the theory of "Israel the deliverer" remains the product of magical thinking. It seems to call on us to transition, in the blink of an eye, from enmity to love, asking everyone, including Israel's immediate victims, to act on this love they are expected to embrace.
Some might rightly believe that "the cause" should not be entitled to a veto over the national sovereignty of the countries concerned; others might even believe that events in Gaza are not their moral or political concern. Nonetheless, turning a blind eye to developments on the Palestinian-Israeli front undermines their own national interests, as it overlooks the need to root out the sources of tension in the region or, at the very least, to control or contain them. These tensions, as we have repeatedly seen, knock on every regional door and make their way in without asking for permission.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has just taken a step forward and toward reality, stating that negotiation with the Israelis is inevitable. However, efforts to expand our circle of friends in the region and the world are critical for even marginally improving our position in such negotiations.
If it has been said that the recent war has made previous peace plans obsolete, and it has, then drawing inspiration from the spirit of those plans, just like building friendships, remains a necessary prerequisite for our countries not to appear entirely empty-handed in any future negotiations.
If it happens, the fall of Netanyahu and his government coalition would certainly push in this direction. On the one hand, it would slightly reduce the imbalance between victor and vanquished, and on the other, it would create a healthier psychological climate for any kind of settlement process.
Such considerations, with all their complexity, do not intersect with either "deliverance" and "love" at any point, nor with "enmity." Accordingly, they do not promise an abrupt transition from hell to heaven.
As for the deep schisms of our societies and the overwhelming acrimony of our "dialogues," they are what stand behind this rigid polarization of the "enmity"/"deliverance" binary, not any analysis anxious to find the "appropriate position." If there is a little hope for mending some of our societies’ fractures, taking a sensible path toward achieving our goals is an opportunity that comes second only to the opportunity for the militia’s arms to be handed to the state.
The rise of a Palestinian voice capable of inspiring their people and helping neighbors formulate a sensible approach would undoubtedly help. Will such a voice emerge?