After most had expected an imminent US/Israeli strike on Iran, it never materialized. Matters have calmed somewhat for now, but questions around the scale and timing of such a strike remain. Would it send a deterrent message to Iran intended to compel a shift in its regional policy? Or, as others imagine, would the goal be to pursue an open-ended, fully-fledged war to overthrow the regime?
This latter scenario, toppling the regime with a knockout blow, remains unlikely given the nature of its political system and the regime’s ideological, political, and military composition. However, the regime could be weakened, and its top brass could be left to face difficult choices, which would further contribute to undermining it.
Changes in the region, most notably the change in Syria, have undoubtedly significantly weakened Tehran’s hand, and thus its strategic influence in the “power game” of the Levant.
Of course, the repercussions of the Israeli war are also significant; this is a war of attrition on Lebanon, which remains unconstrained, as Lebanon has borne and continues to bear heavy losses. One must also add the changes that have occurred in Lebanon itself: the new authorities (presidency and government) have repeatedly stressed that establishing a monopoly on arms is a priority for allowing the state to regain its natural role as the sole authority to make decisions of war and peace. Despite the difficulties, and notwithstanding some progress in this area, it remains a top priority for the authorities and enjoys broad popular support under the banner of moving toward reviving the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and ending Lebanon’s function as a “mailbox” in regional conflicts.
Returning to the scenarios of a war on Iran, the objective of the US appears to remain changing Iran’s policies, particularly in foreign political and security regional affairs - that is what matters most to the international forces confronting Tehran, more so than domestic issues like popular uprising, which rang the alarm about domestic economic and livelihood challenges in particular. These are challenges the authorities must address pragmatically if they are to set the country on a path toward building stability rather than denying reality. Even if the crisis can be contained for a short period, it would not be durably resolved so long as the underlying causes of domestic social tensions remain unresolved.
Many Arab and regional parties seeking stability in the Gulf and the Middle East are working to mediate, contain the situation, halt escalation, and avert a war that could lead to many possibilities.
The triad of the “nuclear issue,” “ballistic missiles,” and “proxies” involved in regional conflicts are the broad themes of the so-called “6+1” negotiations, though they are nominally “the nuclear issue.” These negotiations stumbled, stopped, and then began to return in different forms and formulas, both direct and indirect.
At this sensitive stage of the confrontation and amid multiple possible trajectories, there is a race between dialogue and conflict on the Iranian front. President Trump’s insistence on “zero nuclear enrichment” in Iran is among the most complex issues on the negotiating table, should talks resume. Tehran categorically rejects this demand, insisting instead on its right to enrichment under the terms and rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It should be recalled that Iran now possesses enough enriched uranium to raise enrichment levels to 90 percent, and thereby enter the nuclear club, within months.
The American proposal to establish a regional enrichment center in the Gulf, in which Iran would participate, presents an alternative to enrichment on Iranian soil that has also been categorically rejected by Tehran. The role of Israel is also a factor. A decisive question, at this highly complex regional moment, is whether Israel can push Washington toward a war with Iran despite their divergent priorities in the region.
All these questions remain on indirect and direct negotiation tables, and they are interconnected. Will rising tension, accompanied by necessary yet insufficient signals of de-escalation we see from time to time, reinforce containment and allow for a gradual return to negotiations being the only option? Will we witness “limited wars” that send messages and threats through controlled escalation? Or will we see an open-ended war whose repercussions could extend beyond the immediate Iranian strategic geographical theater, albeit to varying degrees? Could this be followed by a return to negotiations under any framework? These are all questions that the coming days, both near and farther ahead, will answer.
