Following the first round of indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran in Muscat last week, senior officials from both countries sent positive signals. However, before a date was set for the second round of talks, Iran’s foreign minister announced what Iran calls “red lines” and threatened to go to war if the American side insisted on ignoring them. The US also gave its response through the media, with footage of the American negotiating delegation visiting the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier.
The red lines game is not new, and rival states are not the only ones who play it. It plays out in every facet of life, even in families and marriages. Red lines are drawn in commercial negotiations and negotiations between labor unions and employers, among others. The recent announcement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of his country’s red lines in a televised interview falls within this same framework.
Red lines, as a rule, do not always remain red; they can be graded.
That is, they shift with shifts in the balance of power and interests. In political negotiations, they can be either real or tactical. The latter are sometimes used to “maneuver” and pressure the other side into making concessions in other areas. I believe that a careful reading of the Iranian foreign minister’s statement leads to the conclusion that Iran’s red lines are one example. The minister chose to announce them through the media, not behind the closed doors of negotiating rooms. They were likely made for domestic consumption or to up the stakes.
One could, in this context, point to what happened after the defeat of the 1967 war. Arab leaders met at a summit in Khartoum and announced three red lines that they called the “three no’s”: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel. They needed to announce these “no’s” to absorb the shock of the defeat and Israel’s occupation of territories in three Arab states.
By the end of 1970, however, those “no’s” had begun to erode. The door to negotiation, which had been shut and repudiated, was cautiously opened when the Egyptian leadership accepted the initiative proposed by US Secretary of State Rogers that year. Indirect negotiation with Israel was thereby described as necessary. This was the first crack in the wall of Arab rejection. Over time, other cracks followed, leading to the collapse of the other two walls: peace and recognition.
In countries shaken by internal instability as a result of revolutions or uprisings that undermined peace and stability over the past few years, like Somalia or Iraq, new actors emerged to fill the political vacuum in a struggle for power. In most cases, the various actors draw red lines around their interests. The multiplicity of factions, as well as the overlap of constantly shifting alliances, leads to an entanglement of these red lines, to the point that they become difficult to distinguish. The country then turns into a rainbow of fiefdoms, with its territory becoming a minefield. Contemporary Libya presents an ideal case.
Yesterday’s red lines of one team or faction are not those of today. Situations can change in various ways, giving rise to new alliances and alignments. These changes, in turn, transform previous red lines and announce new ones. The disappearance of national red lines from the agendas of all the warring parties is a truly striking manifestation of this phenomenon. They have all compromised on sovereignty over its wealth, borders, and territory.
