Before the momentum generated by Lebanon “breaking of the taboo” of engaging in direct negotiations with Israel began to subside, there began to emerge European reverberations that complement the projects of Benjamin Netanyahu for the future of the Middle East.
Having hosted last week the “negotiation” process in the presence of President Donald Trump, Washington’s position is understandable. Trump’s apparent unawareness that engaging with Israel is prohibited by law in Lebanon shows that the negotiations’ “program” had been set by another party, with Washington adopting it in full.
In reality, this “program” is the product of joint efforts between Israel and Lebanese-American groups aligned with it - groups that had played a similar role during the 1982 invasion and the May 17 Agreement of 1983. Today, Netanyahu seeks to achieve one of two desired outcomes, or both: either a civil war leading to partition and fragmentation, or full occupation backed and endorsed by the West.
The general atmosphere in Lebanon is unsettling. The country’s current divisions are perhaps the worst since the civil war that erupted in 1975. At the sectarian level, this division is reflected today in statements, media appearances, and social media discourse.
Within Christian politics, there are signs, particularly the broad support for direct negotiations with Israel, that some Lebanese Christian leaders are highly optimistic about regaining what they lost over past decades, especially since the decline of “political Maronitism” beginning in 1975, which was later reinforced by the Taif Accords that ended the war and ultimately by the dominance of Hezbollah.
This is underscored by the repeated media appearances of Lebanese-American activists who have not yet shed the exclusionary resentments of the past, as well as the maps some are circulating and promoting in the United States - naturally under the Likud’s patronage - alongside the “Greater Israel” maps that Netanyahu seeks to turn into reality.
On the other hand, within the Muslim space, many Shiites feel they would be the biggest losers if Israel were to strip them of the political, economic, and security influence they had gained over the era of Hezbollah’s arms and Iran’s regional expansion. They also fear that their heavy reliance on Iran may have already cost them what should have been automatic support from their Sunni partners in any confrontation with their “common enemy,” Israel.
After losing their successive bets on Nasserist Arabism, then Palestinian fedayeen Arabism, and later Saddam-era Arabism, the Sunnis, who had been politically divided for decades, found stability under the prosperity brought by “Hariri-style politics” during his time.
The assassination of Rafik Hariri in Iran-dominated Lebanon, along with the sectarian dimensions of the Syrian war (2011–2025), have reconfigured the Sunni scene. Multiple factions emerged, and direct negotiations with Israel are likely to add a dilemma, potentially deepening Sunni fragmentation between Islamist, Arab nationalist, and leftist factions on one side, and right-wing liberal currents and figures from the business world on the other.
The role of the Druze remains. Though they are among the smaller sectarian components in Lebanon, Syria, and occupied Palestine, they possess highly significant advantages that have allowed them to go on despite their religious isolation for over a thousand years, with many of their figures rising to political prominence.
The post-independence Lebanese and Syrian constitutions considered the Druze, like the Alawites and Ismailis, as part of the Muslim community. Following a “divide and conquer" strategy, however, the Zionist movement exploited the secrecy of the doctrine, the esoteric nature of its practices, and the particularity of its traditions and concepts, to claim that the Druze are not Muslims or even Arabs.
Unfortunately, the ignorance of certain extremist groups has placed Druze communities and regions in the Levant under a kind of demographic, cultural, and economic siege. The current Israeli leadership claims concern for the wellbeing of the Druze, and it seeks to exploit their fears of regional sectarian strife by committing to their protection.
This claim, of course, finds some resonance among fearful members of the community and those who believe in such “protection.” Some have been swayed through social media platforms designed to “infiltrate Druze youth” who may lack deep knowledge of their history and heritage. The more prudent among them, on the other hand, tend toward caution. They do not believe that Muslims are facing a collapse that would tempt some weak souls to abandon their identity, origins, and culture.
Going back to the start of this article and the “European echoes” of Netanyahu’s projects, which go beyond Iran to include targeting Türkiye, and perhaps others as well. Unfortunately, some Western European leaders close to Israel have aligned themselves with these ideas in their statements.
However, a “global Christian war against Muslims,” as Netanyahu envisions it, would not serve anyone’s interests in my view, including Israel’s. And while Israel’s leader may still feel confident in his lobbies’ ability to pressure and steer Western governments as he wishes, there are indications that his ambitions could be thwarted.
There is currently a split - even within the American Christian–Jewish base - and it may widen further after Trump.
Moreover, the positions of Pope Leo XIV reflect a complete rejection of the logic of war and hatred. Alongside European reservations, there are also the positions of Russia and China - these are forces that cannot be dismissed.
Finally, in the Arab and Islamic world, there remain rational actors who understand the dangers of the current scheme and the scope of its targets. They know that there can be no leniency in the face of plots to aggravate strife, division, and fragmentation.
