Sam Menassa
TT

Blinken and the Diplomacy of Rebuilding Trust

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit to Saudi Arabia, where he held meetings with high-ranking officials and made several pledges, is another promising indication that Washington has reconsidered its policy choices. Indeed, coming just a few weeks after President Joe Biden’s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made his trip, Blinken’s visit affirmed that Washington is keen on addressing the region’s concerns and helping it find solutions to problems. His discussions with Saudi officials addressed a long list of issues: Iran, the efforts to end the Yemen war, and how to expand and diversify US-Saudi cooperation in non-energy and non-defense sectors. Blinken also met with the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council and discussed consolidating the coalition against ISIS.

This diplomatic overture towards Riyadh comes with the framework of the US response to the Saudi-Iranian agreement signed under the auspices of China. Indeed, the first sign that the US has changed its posture since the agreement was its reported attempts to resume negotiations with Iran regarding the latter’s nuclear program. However, leaks indicate that Iran is not enthusiastic about the prospect. Moreover, a statement released by France, Germany, and Britain last week expressed concerns about Iran’s enrichment of Uranium. Another indicator is that it is playing a more active role in ensuring maritime security in the Gulf.

Although Washington’s foreign policy remains ambiguous, these steps seem geared towards achieving three objectives: the first attempts to reproduce and coopt China’s success in facilitating Saudi Arabia and Iran’s agreement to normalize relations. The second intends to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons through negotiations on a deal that remains vague and to prevent Israel from taking military action to end this program. As for the third, it confronts Iran’s actions in Gulf waters and fortifies America’s role in safeguarding this region’s security in general. The pursuit of three tracks could be read as a reaction to the course of changes in the region that were anchored by the recent agreement between Riyadh and Tehran and its results.

The US must overcome several difficult hurdles to achieve these goals. This includes what we hope to achieve regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which also continues to worry the Gulf states and other countries in the region. An agreement with Tehran could alleviate these concerns, but it would not dispel them. The ultimate question is whether Washington will manage to resolve this matter in a manner that does not threaten the security and stability of the Gulf and involve them in the negotiation process. The answer could well determine the future of Washington’s relations with the countries of the region.

As for fortifying Washington’s role in safeguarding the security of the Gulf region in general, its trajectory hinges on the long-term impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement, which is still in its infancy and cannot be assessed yet.

Nonetheless, the traditional US approach to ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is certainly now a thing of the past. The US should recalibrate in response to these countries’ attempts to reformulate their economic and social domestic agenda and their ties with the rest of the world. The current US administration has yet to properly understand that Saudi Arabia, like the Gulf countries in general, now prioritizes its national interests and the aspirations of its people. It is trying to balance its relations between East and West, pursuing a policy of “zero problems.” The reconciliation of Saudi Arabia and Iran should be seen from this lens.

Will the US strategy for the region revolve around these objectives? The answer is no because it has no comprehensive economic and political strategy and is almost exclusively focused on combating terrorism. Moreover, it is dealing with issues “piecemeal.” Meanwhile, human rights questions do not generally speak to what Washington wants or what the region expects from it. Despite its recent push, the US administration’s efforts are weak when compared to China’s openness, which is nonetheless confined to facilitating political settlements and resolving economic and security disputes.

Whatever Blinken achieves from this visit, which is part of the US effort to “not leave a vacuum for our strategic competitors in the region,” as President Biden put it during his visit to Jeddah last summer, the US will remain weak. It has not done enough in the face of the threats presented by the tensions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other conflict zones, most notably the region’s most recent civil war in Sudan. We have the broad challenges posed by the tensions between Iran and Israel, which may explode unless progress is made through negotiation and audacious steps are taken to curb greater enrichment and Iran’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Last but not least, we have the Israeli government’s brutal treatment of Palestinians, which destabilizes the region as a whole.
Indeed, the main requisite for saving itself is finding a just and comprehensive peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that accounts for the rights of the Palestinians, thereby avoiding the pitfalls that folded John Kerry’s initiative during Barack Obama’s second term and Jared Kushner’s initiative during Donald Trump’s term. Only Washington can revitalize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and diffuse this time bomb hindering its return to the region. The US should cooperate with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular and the countries of the region in general to forge new bilateral relationships through which to address shared concerns and seize new opportunities... If it does, the US will ride back to the region on a white horse.