Palestinian Rights and the Lives and Deaths of Leaders!

Last Saturday, the British daily "The Guardian" published a piece about "Israel's prime target." The question its Jerusalem correspondent Julian Borger poses is one that has been asked by many in a variety of countries: would killing Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar end the war in the Gaza Strip?
Such a question leads readers, as well as speculators, down several paths, some linked to complex military technology and some to shelters and tunnels, not to mention how clever is the target, Sinwar in this case, and the soldiers chasing him, the Israelis... caution is inherent to questions of this kind, the fear of descending into a level where intelligence assessments are brought together with the kind of tricks and ruses associated more with cinema than anything else.
However, these technicalities are not the central issue. Israel successfully liquidating Sinwar might bring the war in Gaza to end, and it might not. However, as soon as we move beyond the "immediate" and focus on the broader "actual" situation, we realize that the Palestinians’ right to statehood and dignity is difficult to liquidate. This is not mere impassioned popular rhetoric. Indeed, no one needs to be reminded that Israel has in the past assassinated many Palestinian leaders of a very broad range of affiliations and inclinations. These leaders were killed across a long period of time and in an array of countries, but Israel has not managed to kill the Palestinians’ pursuit of their rights.
The fear is that Benjamin Netanyahu and those behind him, with their vulgar instrumentalist mindset that cannot be separated from their chauvinistic nationalism, think so, that they consider eliminating Sinwar would not only end the Gaza war but also nullify the Palestinians' rights and make attaining them impossible. If Israel believes so, and it likely does, this behavior will backfire, harming the Jewish state, in the long term, to the same extent that it is now harming the Palestinians.
The problem, and by extension the solution, might be better formulated by going back to the distinction between military action and political action, and the distinct function of each, especially in light of the growing distance between the two. Neither will the continuing genocidal war on Gaza annihilate the Palestinians, nor will more operations like those of October 7 wipe Israel off the map.
It seems that this claim, which should be self-evident, brings us back to square one: how can the region and its warring parties go back to politics?
We know that the hatred and resentment on both sides are glaring and more acute today than ever before. We also know that imagining negotiations and agreements like the Oslo or Camp David Accords happening now is nothing more than a wild fantasy. Today’s Israel is not the Israel of the Labor Party and the "peace camp," and Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and their affiliates are not the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The accumulation of experiences on both sides that had pushed them to pursue politics instead of waging war in the past are as far from the Likud's Israel as they are from Palestinian Islamists. Moreover, we know that the European powers that used to mediate and bridge the gaps between the two sides, most of which were led by social democratic parties (Austria, Norway, France...), are no longer able, or are not willing, to repeat previous experiences. As for the US administration- which, at the end of the day, is the one who can apply genuine pressure on the Jewish state- it has shifted from its traditional pursuit of "peace in the Middle East" to addressing the immediate problems of the conflict and their immediate ramifications.
Despite the Iranian element that troubles the Americans, the United States- at least up until now- has not been compelled to change its new doctrine. Indeed, Washington is implementing this new doctrine confident and reassured about two things. First, so long as it is armed and supported diplomatically by the West, Israel can maintain the upper hand. Second, there is almost no chance of influential international forces that can match or balance US power in the Middle East entering the fray. The limited roles of Russia and China, on whom some had been betting on to intervene, undeniably attest to this fact.
Thus, we find ourselves in an extremely ironic situation because two things are true at the same time: the need for politics is at its highest and political tools and preparations are at their lowest. The pitiful state of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, Israel refraining from addressing and discussing the "day after," are two equally telling examples.
With this kind of deadlock, we could see talk about Sinwar and his potential assassination flourish. If actions of this sort can be linked to outcomes tied to the ongoing war, it would be delusional to link them to the roots of the Palestinian issue and its continued existence.
Meanwhile, amid this deadlock, we can say one thing: if Netanyahu equates Palestinian rights with Sinwar, as he previously did with Yasser Arafat to assassinate the cause by assassinating its symbol, then the Palestinians should have the awareness to avoid making this equivalence. This is especially true for those who speak of the ‘’cause’’ in a manner that elevates it from a political matter to one of sanctity, and then downgrades it from sanctity to equivalence to Sinwar.