Every sane person in Sudan seeks an end to this war that has left unprecedented destruction, sparing nothing and no one. Yet talk of an “end” to the war is often framed ambiguously, failing to define the basic terms. There is much talk of “returning to the civic path” and “transition.” The slogan “no to war” is repeated, but without even minimal common ground on how the war can actually end or how the transition and restoration of a democratic civilian rule will be achieved. The most dangerous question is: do we simply mean turning back the clock to the pre-period, carrying on as though nothing has changed?
No single party has an inherent right to govern. Those who want to return to power by merely going back in time to the pre-war era are vying to leap over everything that has changed on the scene. Post-war Sudan will not be the same.
The December Revolution gave legitimacy to the civilian forces. However, those forces squandered that legitimacy with their bickering, conflicts and the schemes that ultimately led to this war. No party can absolve itself of responsibility for what happened. Many Sudanese no longer view those forces as they did in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, and it is now clear that they have lost the support of many, even among the revolution’s youth themselves, as a result of their divergences on the war and the severe polarization it produced in the public arena.
The Forces for Freedom and Change have themselves splintered under their various names and formations, and segments of them now stand on the side of the Rapid Support Forces, joining in its illusory parallel government.
An ambiguous position on the Rapid Support Forces does not serve the interests of these forces nor the interests of the country. The future of these forces is not a matter that can be glossed over. A significant proportion of the Sudanese population now rejects the presence of these forces and their leaders on the political scene. Any formula that allows the Rapid Support Forces to make a comeback under a new guise or label will be nothing more than a fragile, temporary truce. Worse, it would send a dangerous message: violence is an acceptable path to political or economic gains, and that those who arm themselves, kill innocent citizens, loot their property, destroy the country and carry out atrocities could later be rewarded with a share of power.
Given this blurred picture, some are working hard to promote a narrative that equates the army with the Rapid Support Forces to score political points, or because they believe that weakening the army is the only way to remove it from the political arena. Accordingly, they have pushed slogans like “the Kizan army” and “we don’t have an army.”
The Sudanese army, regardless of the criticisms and reservations one may have, is a national institution that predates the country’s independence. It symbolizes the sovereignty and unity of the state. It is not acceptable, neither morally nor patriotically, to put the army on equal footing with the Rapid Support Forces with all the grave crimes on the latter’s record and its behavior in the current war. We must reform the army and develop its military doctrine- transforming it into a national professional force and freeing it from political exploitation- not criminalize it or undermine its legitimacy.
The central question, then, is: how to secure a transition to civilian rule without repeating previous failures, guaranteeing stability. Legitimacy cannot be automatically granted to any faction; the only acceptable legitimacy is that of the ballot boxes. For this reason, any transitional period must be brief, present clear objectives, and allow for elections at the earliest possible date.
To this end, there must be an inclusive inta-Sudanese dialogue, excluding no one, to address questions around future governance and how to ensure that the transition prepares the country for a return to civilian rule through the elections.
In the current scene, both sides include exclusionary elements: there are Islamists who want to exclude Sumud in all its names and permutations, and there are those within Sumud who call for excluding Islamists from the arena and labeling them a terrorist group. This path will not end the disputes, nor will it lead to a solution to Sudan’s crisis. Indeed, it will only complicate things, prolong the crisis, and reduce the chances of stability under any future authority.
I believe that political exclusion must come from the ballot box or a fair trial. We cannot push anyone out through incitement and the inflammation of passions, nor exceptional measures that entrench a culture of vengeance. That requires a comprehensive framework for accountability and legal political disqualification. Instead of the language of exclusion, let us phrase this process as accountability without impunity, democracy without exclusion, a short transition leading to elections, prioritizing the protection of civilians, and eliminating the logic of brute force.
