Luxury cars, modern residential towers, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and most notably, the restoration of the historic al-Rashid Street with its shops, bookstores, and cafes in the old city center: Baghdad is brimming with foreign delegations, suffocating traffic jams, and the bustle of commercial and entertainment activities, diplomatic meetings, investment conferences, and even forums that have reintroduced questions of freedoms, democracy, and partnership in the political process.
The general scene in Baghdad, with this calm on the surface, contrasts with its anxious political underbelly. The faces of ordinary Iraqis, preoccupied with their daily lives and maintaining a cautious calm, are the majority that has largely managed to live their lives regardless of whatever they fear could happen before or after the elections. On the other side, we see the faces of the political elite who are overwhelmed by concerns about their future and their standing, as well as those of factions hidden from view that have deep apprehensions over their future, their representation, and their shares of power.
This ruling class, across its political, economic, and security layers, is drowning in the mechanics of its electoral machinery. It has been undercut by leaks and recordings that hurt their election chances, or in their quest for guarantees of protection against American and Israeli threats. Between the two stands an indifferent population, like a volcano that could erupt at any moment.
The top question in Baghdad today revolves around threats: Will Iraq be targeted by an American or Israeli strike? How consequential would such a strike be, and what would it aim to achieve? The uncertainty that leaves Iraqis with deep anxieties stems from the potential ramifications. Would they present the targets with a pretext to pounce on what remains of the state or to subdue their opponents? If the expected strike takes place, would it be broad, targeting infrastructure as well as individuals and figures of any rank? Would striking individuals or the leadership weaken the targeted factions? And most crucially: what comes after the strike?
Between the fear of a possible military strike and the anxiety over its consequences, we find the sudden and unconditional release of Russian-Israeli journalist Elizabeth Tsurkov. There was no deal. For Iraqis, this means that US and Israeli pressure had reached boiling point, forcing the party holding her in captivity to let her go. The government, for its part, maintained complete secrecy around the negotiations and handover, amid rumors of massive threats lurking behind the talks.
Leaders of the ruling Coordination Framework watch the events unfolding in neighboring countries with anticipation, burdened by both security and political concerns. The prime minister they had chosen, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, has broken their leash, becoming a serious competitor not only to their rivals but to them as well. For many of them, a second Sudani term would amount to a kind of political assassination. Free from their calculations, he is managing his electoral and political position to his own benefit: launching reconstruction projects in Baghdad and other regions, pursuing stable external relations to bridges toward a return to the center of the Green Zone and the premiership.
Only Nouri al-Maliki maintains a share in the Shiite political house and can safeguard his role. He remains both a burden and an unavoidable door to the “Ziggurat” building, the prime minister’s headquarters in the Green Zone. Alongside him is the absent-yet-present Moqtada al-Sadr, who has kept the political guessing: will he withdraw or take or part? Together, despite all the new aspirants eager to sideline them or diminish their roles, Maliki and Sadr continue to form the two poles of decision-making.
Accordingly, between each conference, a workshop, an election rally, a cafe, a sidewalk, or a public park, we see relative calm in Baghdad, and it may well be temporary.
