This is not an op-ed about “the shifts of sects” but the shifts ‘’within’’ sects that emerged in recent days or that had previously been latent, already present beneath the surface before they recently rose to the fore.
Of course, every discussion of “the sects” and their positions necessarily entails broad strokes riddled with generalizations. Nonetheless, sects remain the best available ontological category for developing accurate notions of developments in Lebanon and understanding the trajectories that these developments could take.
The Raouche Rock incident and the controversy it stirred offered a condensed presentation of sectarian communities’ stances, some that were surprising and others that went against reductionist expectations premised on stereotypes.
If we accept the notion that the attitudes of sectarian communities can be deduced from the political behavior of the top officials who represent them, as per the Lebanese political system- albeit without making the false assumption that this yardstick offers much precision- we could claim that “the Sunnis’ representation” approach the fundamental question of weapons currently facing the county in the healthiest manner.
The “voice of the Sunni component” in the state may have been hushed relative to the cacophony coming from the bastions of other sects, but the factors behind the “Sunni stance” are neither mundane nor easy to disregard. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who cannot be reduced to his Sunnism, stood for responsible and patriotic scrupulousness, which is unusual in Lebanese politics, paired with a legalistic consciousness and a constitutional mindset. Together, these factors demonstrate that addressing disarmament speaks to the reformer in Salam, not just the Sunni in him.
One could perhaps make the case that these qualities do not contradict some aspects, among them the “political Lebanonization” of the Sunnis often attributed to the late Rafic Hariri, of the background of “Sunni attitudes.” Another element is the sense of victimhood stemming from Hariri’s assassination and the broad suspicions of who had been behind it, which made the Raouche incident feel, to many, akin to rewarding the murderer inside the victim’s home. The community’s heavily urban demography, which is favorable to the state and averse to violence, contributed to shaping that background, especially since the waves of religious-political radicalism in the region have begun to recede and as the Gulf model makes its case by emphasizing a stability that supporters see as the antithesis to unbridled extremism.
As for the Maronites and Christians more broadly, they remain, for well known historical reasons, the sect closest to being the state’s base and, by extension, the most committed to the principle of the state’s monopoly of means of violence. Among the political parties that represent the Christian community, the ‘’Lebanese Forces’’ and the ‘’Kataeb’’ have perhaps adopted the positions most faithful to this tradition. However, the community’s top state officials, the president and the leaders of the agencies and institutions that fall under the presidency, have taken a different line.
Here, we are facing what could be called the Aounist cavity- in reference to former president Michel Aoun and his “understanding” with Hezbollah, a cavity with the legacy of Elie Hobeika and the “Tripartite Accord” on its outer edges. One cannot fail to recall the "alliance of minorities” theory, which the rise of the new Syrian regime may have rekindled and solidified. Several junctures, some foundational (like “Operation Fajr el-Jouroud” battles on the Syrian-Lebanese border) and some more recent (like the massacres along the Syrian coast and in Sweida, not to mention the bombing of Damascus’s St. Elias Church and the reverberations of those tragedies) were traversed on the path that led us here.
The Aounist political trajectory is also a continuity of another broad political track: the drive to return to the pre-Taif era, which the first Aoun had fought with arms. As to the way the president engaged with the prime minister during the Raouche Rock episode, it only reinforces the impression that he is viscerally hostile to the Taif Agreement.
In at least two respects, this Aounist inclination is flipping traditional Christian mode on their head: one is the radical approach to confronting Hezbollah’s armament, and the other is extreme concern for aligning with prevailing regional and international attitudes, which the Aounist school has nothing but disregard for and whose opportunities it never fails to squander.
As for the top Shiite official, he decided, amid the climate imposed by Hezbollah’s armament, to establish a parallel political “state” to supplement the parallel military “state” that Hezbollah had established. Leveraging his solidarity with the president, the speaker of parliament has managed to position himself as the country’s primary domestic and foreign policy arbiter. Meanwhile, intra-Lebanese divisions and hostilities continue to deepen, and Lebanon’s place and weight in the world steadily decline.
We can, however, note that the Shiite community’s foremost official is betraying Imam Musa al-Sadr, his former mentor, twice. Defying the stagnation of the Shiite political representation, which had lagged behind the educational, economic, and financial progress of the community, was among the most prominent defining features of Sadrism- Speaker Berri, meanwhile, has held his post for no less than a third of a century. As for the second U-turn on Sadr’s approach, the latter’s ultimate concern was compelling the state to safeguard the South and its people, shielding them from Palestinian and Lebanese radical movements that had been striving to broaden the arena of conflict- Hezbollah, with the Speaker’s blessing, seeks the exact opposite. That is why Musa al-Sadr had to be reinvented to allow the two sides of the “Shiite duo” to synergize their efforts.
This reinvention, in its current form, is what we call “zaabara” (a scam) in colloquial Arabic, that portrays defeat as victory and victory as defeat, and so on and so forth.
