Lebanese citizens start and end their days with questions of what the future will bring amid political paralysis and economic hardship... and with justified anxiety about the future.
Meanwhile, Washington piles on the pressure to push through the “Lebanese part” of its regional effort that naturally aligns with the US and Israel’s goals.
Despite the many “Lebanese names” among the American diplomats in the Middle East, there is no doubt that their loyalty to Washington and its interests comes first.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese inside Lebanon continue fantasize about the prominent role that their expatriate kin could play in the hallways of American politics. This “unattainable dream” is shared by many expatriates as well; during President Donald Trump’s election campaign for a second term, they bet that family ties and business deals would allow them to have influence on him positively.
As usual, they (or let’s say many of them) have evidently lost their bet. Their aspirations were unfounded because of the hard realities they refuse to acknowledge.
To begin with, there are “two problems” standing in the way. The first is a fundamentally “Lebanese problem,” and the second is an “Arab–Islamic problem.”
With respect to the “first problem,” while “Judeo–Christian values” are a pillar of the American right’s politics, and the political loyalties and geopolitical views of the “old Lebanese immigrants” (the majority of whom are Christian) are very different to those of the “new Lebanese Americans”...
The “new Lebanese Americans” are the Lebanese who have left for the US since World War II, mostly during the Lebanese Civil War, and most of them are Muslims.
It should be noted that the “old immigrants,” along with their children and grandchildren, see Lebanon (its political, national, and religious identity) differently from those who arrived later, particularly after the Civil War (1975–1990).
Another important point is that the “old immigrants,” by and large (especially the Christians) have become “Americanized.” They have assimilated into the “white Christian political culture” of the United States, particularly through the Republican Party. They are part of the business class. By contrast, a large portion of the “new Lebanese Americans” continued to identify with their origins, an attachment that continues to grow in parallel with regional influences (Israeli, Iranian, and, more recently, Turkish).
This split seems to be reflected in the tension between the proposals of “intermediaries” and American diplomats (including active Jewish figures like Jared Kushner and Morgan Ortagus) and Lebanese Christian diplomats and advisers such as Tom Barrack, Massad Boulos, and the new American Ambassador in Beirut, Michael Issa, on one hand, and , on the other, local Lebanese forces that have political and military weight, as well as regional ties.
In truth, Washington and Tel Aviv are well aware of Lebanon’s fragility. They understand the intricate local political calculus in this country of “18 sects,” that has not stopped them from behaving with “willful ignorance.”
For example, Washington and Tel Aviv fully understand that Iran has a strong influence on all of the Shiite communities in the Middle East. Nevertheless, they are pushing the Lebanese government to take steps that do not account for the delicacy of the country’s power-sharing system.
Moreover, this “heavy-handed approach” is being taken as Iraq is about to hold critical elections that will test Tehran’s influence, which it attained in 2003 because of the US and Israel’s policies. They will be held after the Iranian regime had been “defanged” in Syria, whose “new political identity” has yet to take shape amid a Turkish–Israeli tug-of-war over its territory.
That brings us to the “second problem:” the Arab–Islamic dimension of the Lebanese question.
It is evident, unfortunately, that the US and Israeli pressure on Lebanon have failed to account for what has happened in Gaza since October 7, 2023. They have ignored the threats faced by West Bank residents and others, despite the promises of a “Greater Israel,” by the ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, as well as the extremist settler activists like Daniella Weiss.
In my view, the first question is whether President Trump can “persuade” the Israeli right to commit to his Abrahamic project as the latter presents plans for displacement and settlement expansion.
Indeed, it will be difficult to imagine the regional repercussions (in but also beyond Lebanon) of the White House failing to stand in the way of these plans, which a growing number of sensible Jews around the world now recognize as a heavy burden and a dangerous threat for Jewish communities across the world.
Before threatening the fragile Lebanese government, Washington must make the next move. It must show a serious commitment to ensuring comprehensive peace in the region. As for wasting time with minor battles meant to divert attention away from the key issue... It will only aggravate and complicate things.
