Those who push the idea that the root of the conflict is sectarian, that our disagreements are a Shiite-Sunni divide, help Iran more than anyone else. Without realizing it, they fall into a trap carefully set by the Iranian regime to fragment societies, divide them, and turn a political conflict into a war of identity that cannot be contained. When the dispute is reduced to its sectarian dimension, it becomes an unresolvable zero-sum problem. The victory of one sect and the defeat of another in religious conflict, which feeds on buried resentments and instincts. These wars never end and produce no winners.
Hezbollah and militias linked to Iran have the same strategy as extremist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS: exploit religion and sectarianism as fuel for destruction. It is a single discourse with different names.
The dispute with the Iranian regime is not fundamentally sectarian nor religious. Several factors make clear that it is a political conflict.
First, the majority of those opposed to the Iranian regime are in Iran itself. Most of those who took to the streets are Shiites. They were not Sunnis waging a sectarian struggle but because they are Iranian citizens opposed to the regime that has harmed them, impoverished them, and dragged them into isolation and cyclical conflicts. Indeed, this regime that claims to be the protector of the Shiites has killed more Shiites than any other.
Second, Shiite Iranians who see this regime as a destructive project that does not represent them are at the forefront of the anti-regime opposition abroad. This includes millions of Iranians who have been forced to leave their homeland. In the Arab region, some of the bravest opponents of Iranian influence were Shiites, some of whom lost their lives because they insisted on being citizens before anything else. Shiite religious authorities, politicians, writers, and intellectuals (the list is long, but it suffices to mention the cleric Ali al-Amin, the courageous Lebanese writer Lokman Slim, and prominent Iraqi political figures such as Faiq al-Sheikh Ali) have opposed the regime, not for sectarian considerations but from purely national positions. Just as patriotic Iranians defend their country, these men and women defend their own nations, rejecting the occupation of their countries and the effort to take their sect hostage.
Third, in (military and political) practice, Iran has never distinguished between Sunnis and Shiites. The missiles it launched at Gulf states did not distinguish between one sect and another, just as its interventions in Arab countries it dominates have led to the impoverishment and destruction of all communities without exception. In some cases, Shiites have been harmed more than others, as we see in South Lebanon, where thousands have been displaced from their homes and villages. While the loyalties of some parties and militias are with Iran, they do not represent their sects nor speak on their behalf; rather, they are tools of its political project, as are others from various sects, and even Christians.
Tehran claims to defend the Shiites but represses them at home and persecutes them abroad. Its slogan of "defending the Shiites" is nothing more than a lie to ensure its legitimacy and a tool used to infiltrate societies and expand its influence. The real goal is to preserve power at any cost and expand by any means.
The conflict with Iran, therefore, is not sectarian or ideological. It stems from a dispute over the nature of the state and the regional order. It is a struggle between the model of the nation-state, which the world has settled upon, and a transnation project of proxies, militias, and direct and indirect intervention. The struggle with the Iranian regime today seeks to turn this ideological organization into a normal state and turn this patron of militias and clandestine cells into a patron of schools and universities.
The camp opposed to Iran cannot be reduced to a single sect. It includes everyone who believes in the idea of the nation-state, foremost among them members of the Shiite community who reject Iranian propaganda and the hijacking of their sect, and its transformation into a tool in a political struggle that does not represent them. Those who promote sectarian narratives fall into a trap set by the regime.
