The fighting has not stopped since negotiations in Islamabad came to a halt. President Donald Trump’s dangerous decision to impose a blockade on Iran’s maritime trade has disrupted the entire landscape as Iran threatens to target Gulf ports.
In the battlefield, Israeli forces are advancing in southern Lebanon, and every success they attain there weakens Iran’s negotiating and moral position. Israel has already taken control of roughly a third of Lebanon’s territory, and it is close to seizing three of Hezbollah’s key military strongholds: Bint Jbeil, Khiam, and Taybeh. The Lebanese government has, because of this war, dared to take a historic step by entering direct negotiations with Israel and to defy Hezbollah’s threats.
The Iranians have rushed to request the resumption of negotiations with the United States, suggesting a willingness to offer concessions to end the naval blockade.
The blockade is the most dangerous weapon that can be used against Iran. Impeding Iran’s maritime trade could bring down the Iranian regime if it is sustained long enough and enforced strictly. Of course, choking Iran at sea has consequences and could potentially reignite a broader war.
In a calculated move, President Donald Trump announced a blockade of Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and other ports along the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, as well as preventing any ships from entering or leaving Iran through the Strait of Hormuz. This would cost Iran an estimated half a billion dollars per day, in addition to weakening its political position, after Iran had used its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip against the Arab Gulf states and the global economy.
One potential consequence, the Iranian regime has said, is retaliation through strikes on Gulf ports and a return to mutually assured destruction. Iran has previously shown that it is serious about such threats when it targeted its Arab neighbors, hitting vital civilian infrastructure in six Gulf states, as well as in Iraq and Jordan.
Can Gulf states withstand further losses if their ports (lifelines through which oil, gas and petrochemical products are exported to global markets) are targeted?
In war, they have few options. Gulf countries have already done what they could to avert conflict. American forces were compelled to conduct military operations from naval fleets and bases in countries north of Iran, but Iran chose to strike Gulf facilities to impose costs on the global economy; it succeeded: as oil and gas prices doubled, followed by increases in the cost of transport, aviation, and petroleum products, both direct and indirect.
For this reason, Iran will probably repeat the same strategy and target Gulf states again.
The calculations of the US revolve around balancing pain on both sides and estimates of how long this blockade would need to continue for Iran to be forced into concessions that allow its maritime trade to resume. The US is also considering the resumption of strikes after a two-week truce after assessments of what remains of Iran’s arsenal and its ability to launch further missiles with precision.
At the same time, Iran is deeply wounded after 38 days of war. It has a leadership vacuum and its regional proxies, as seen in Lebanon, have been weakened. The question remains: will it still choose to play this painful game of brinkmanship?
Iran may be able to destroy a significant portion of Gulf maritime and energy infrastructure, but those states would recover. They have the ability to repair the damage and absorb major losses. Iran, however, would be gambling with the survival of its regime in a bet on this new round of confrontation.
The United States has shown its willingness to continue fighting; it could be argued that more strikes that force Iran into surrender are Donald Trump’s best option, as they would allow him to emerge victorious in the eyes of the world.
Indeed, the US suffered few losses in the previous round (13 dead, half of them in a plane crash in Iraq). Meanwhile, Israel is also in favor of continuing the war to extract greater concessions from Iran, with public opinion suggesting Israelis are willing to bear further costs if Iran ceases to pose a persistent regional threat.
Iran’s new leadership may appear fanatical, but this same leadership has expressed a desire to return to negotiations. It has a strong interest in avoiding destruction that risks the very existence of the regime. A blockade and devastation would be less likely if the American and Iranian delegations return to the negotiating table.
