Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif confirmed former US President Donald Trump's claim that the Iranians had given prior warning to Washington before launching its attack on Ain al-Assad (a US base in Anbar, west of Baghdad) in retaliation for the killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2020.
In his new book "The Depth of Patience," Zarif says that the last decision he was privy to following Soleimani's assassination was that "there is no rush for retaliation, and the most effective method is the one always followed by Hezbollah- that is, forcing the other side to maintain an exhausting state of vigilance."
Zarif, who we know, thanks to an audio recording leaked in 2021, had previously complained about the dominance of the IRGC, added that "the Americans had been informed of the attack, by the former Prime Minister of Iraq Adel Abdul Mahdi, before President Hassan Rouhani and the Foreign Ministry." Well, what is the significance of Zarif's story? In truth, there are several important points here. They affirm what we already know about the decision-making process in Iran and the relationship of its politicians with the IRGC. Firstly, Zarif confirmed Trump's assertion that the Iranians had informed the Americans about the Ain al-Assad operation beforehand.
He contradicted the denial of this claim by the former Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, who had stressed that these claims his country had communicated with the US before the attack were "pure lies." Secondly, Zarif's account proves that the Iranian President is the last to know of consequential decisions in Iran.
There is nothing more consequential than engaging with the United States, even if that is done through a symbolic operation intended to save face, as was the case with the "Ain al-Assad" attack. Thirdly, the book confirms that Zarif remains frustrated with his ministry being sidelined by the IRGC Guard; rather his resentment is aggravating. Indeed, the Iranian Foreign Minister had previously criticized Qasem Soleimani himself in a leaked audio recording.
At that time, Zarif complained that the IRGC exerted more influence over foreign affairs and the country's nuclear deal negotiations than he did, hinting that Soleimani had attempted to sabotage the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in collusion with Russia.
"Almost every time I went to negotiate (with the major powers), Soleimani would ask me to make this or that concession or to raise this or that assmatter." He then adds: "Success on the military front was more important than diplomatic success. I was negotiating to ensure success on the military front."
Fourth, Zarif’s book claim that his experience with the Supreme National Security Council after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani was "the bitterest time of his tenure." It was said that "there is no rush to avenge" Soleimani's assassination and that "the most effective method is the one always followed by Hezbollah- that is, forcing the other side to maintain an exhausting state of vigilance."." This meant that Iran thinks of itself as a militia, even in its strategic decision-making, as with regard to engaging with the Americans, and that it sidelined its institutions in favor of the IRGC.
In conclusion, the importance of Zarif's account is that it confirms that we are not facing one Iran, but several: Iran the facade, the Iran that plans, and the Iran that implements. This is what Zarif complained about, so what do those outside Iran have to say?
