Eyad Abu Shakra
TT

Washington: Adding Enemies Is a Costly and Dangerous Policy

The sanctions announced by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on organizations documenting Israeli war crimes and human rights violations in the Gaza Strip were striking. This announcement came just days after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, which had brought China, Russia, and India together, and during which the three great powers concluded agreements that could potentially cost the United States.

In “Donald Trump’s Washington,” documenting crimes, not committing them, is the real crime, even when the crimes range from the mass extermination of civilians to blatant ethnic cleansing.

Over the past seven decades, we have seen, time and again, that the “special relationship” between Washington and every Israeli government always prevails. It would be naive to think, even for a moment, that the American establishment could treat Israel like any other polity in the Middle East.

It is worth nonetheless recalling historical instances when US administrations took a “firm, cautious, and good faith” stance to curb the excesses of fanatic Israeli leaders. Indeed, these administrations recognized that Israeli hardliners were putting the future of their own state at risk, and they intervened to rein them in. Ostensibly, they did so for Israel’s own good, to safeguard its security in a region they have long claimed is a hostile “sea of Arabs and Muslims”.

During the 1956 Suez Crisis, President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration sided with the Soviet Union against the Israeli-British-French on Egypt, the “Tripartite Aggression.” In 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker clashed with then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir when the latter refused to discuss the implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. When he realized that Shamir had been trying to deceive Washington, Baker’s rage was visible: “If the Israelis want to cooperate with peace efforts and implement UN Resolutions, here’s the White House phone number. Call us!”

Both were Republican administrations. How does their approach compare to that of Trump?

Under the leadership of Eisenhower (1953–1961) and George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), the Republican Party was a “broad national tent” that included conservative and moderate liberals, as well as right-wing and centrist figures.

It also respected the peaceful transfer of power, valued democratic institutions, upheld the principle of separation of powers, and embraced national consensus. American politics had yet to drown in the “extremist hysteria” that MAGA now embodies. Blind personal loyalty was not the criteria for administrative and judicial appointments; it was competence, experience, and respectability.

Internationally, the United States had clear political and strategic interests that it pursued through Atlantic partnerships and East Asian alliances, defining friends and foes on largely rational, consistent, and decisive grounds. Economically, its advocacy of the “free market” was rooted in its genuine pursuit of competitiveness, financial efficiency, and open markets, shunning the kinds of petty tariffs and “trade wars” that the Trump administration has imposed on a highly globalized, technologically advanced, and deeply interconnected global economy.

Many American and foreign analysts believe that the future of the US is precarious. No longer confined to fiscal and monetary strategies, its political disputes have become acrimonious and public. One example is the spat between President Trump and his “rival,” Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell. When it comes to defining political and strategic “friends” and “enemies,” the current administration has adopted a harmful, chaotic approach that has alienated allies and neighbors without making progress against competitors, neutralizing rivals, or articulating a coherent vision for dealing with the growing threats to its “unipolar” world.

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin, whose attendees represent nearly half of the world’s population, showed that the two Asian giants, China and India, are reconciling their differences. Despite longstanding border tensions and competing strategic projects (between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC), US tariffs have pushed New Delhi and Beijing closer together.

For his part, Russian President Vladimir Putin has effectively undermined the US-led effort to undermine his country internationally and weaken its economy following the Ukraine war. The rapprochement between China and India is a symbolic “victory” for Moscow, and it could deepen mistrust between Washington and its European NATO allies. Trump has demanded that the latter, particularly Germany, increase their NATO spending, has made overtures to Putin, and tried to purchase Greenland, undermining transatlantic relations and the trust of his allies.

Trump seems indifferent to the costs of creating new adversaries and alienating allies.

Competitors who threaten its global hegemony have put their rivalries aside to move closer together and build a “new world order” that redraws spheres of influence.

Hindering this trajectory will become increasingly difficult if Washington continues to undermine its own educational and research institutions, undercut scientific and academic initiatives, and subordinate global international interests to the narrowest, most insular political whims.

Progress does not mean clinging to the past. The world of tomorrow will inevitably be very different from the world of today.