A year has passed since the fall of the Assad regime. The change has been immense, and its consequences are still unfolding. As the first anniversary approaches, key questions remain unresolved, the most prominent being: Why did Bashar al-Assad and his regime become subservient to Iran so early in his rule?
In my view, had he not pursued such a dangerous policy, he might not have ended up exiled in Moscow. This conviction only grows stronger when reviewing his governance over more than two decades, not merely from the outbreak of protests in 2011.
More than eight years before the uprising against him, Assad’s regime had already been working closely with Iran at political and military levels across the region. In coordination with Tehran, Syria became a hub for covert operations against the Americans after the invasion of Iraq, at a time when Iran was skillfully playing a double game. Tehran used Assad as a base for “resistance” while simultaneously cooperating with Washington to dismantle what remained of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
In an interview I conducted with Assad before those operations began, he vowed to “turn Iraq into another Vietnam.” He was convinced the Americans intended to topple him next after overthrowing Saddam. In reality, Washington showed no interest in Damascus and did not target his rule, viewing Syria instead as a security buffer for Israel.
Between 2004 and 2009, Syria became a training ground and transit point for armed groups – Iraqi, Arab, and “jihadist” – numbering in the thousands. Fighters were smuggled from Syria into Iraq through unstable provinces such as Anbar and Salah al-Din. These operations strengthened Iran’s negotiating position with Washington, and they continued for years afterward.
On a second front, Assad also aligned his regime with Iran’s agenda in Lebanon, assisting in the elimination of many opposition figures and helping Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, consolidate full control. Tehran’s long-term project was to build Lebanon into the most heavily armed front in its regional confrontation with Israel.
When protests broke out in Daraa and later across Syria, it was expected that states harmed by Assad’s regime would offer at least partial support to the new movement. The uprising was indeed successful, and the regime was close to collapse. It would have fallen had Iran not rushed to save it, sending tens of thousands of fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
After surviving this phase, Assad grew even more convinced of the strategic bond with Tehran, believing that the regime’s survival was safest under Iran’s umbrella. In reality, his relationship with Tehran had always been toxic, burdensome, and dangerous for him.
His policies show he never understood the region’s balance of power or the risky game he had entered. Before the revolution, he was not compelled to ally himself with Iran. Europe opened its doors to him after he succeeded his father. The Arab moderate bloc welcomed him. Even many Syrian opposition figures who had resisted his father were hopeful when he came to power.
It is also inaccurate to claim that Bashar moved straight from the clinic to the presidency, as often rumored. In the last years of Hafez al-Assad’s life, Bashar participated from the shadows in presidential activities, attended important meetings, and was familiar with state files. His later decisions revealed that he was nothing like his father, who had maintained balanced ties with Tehran, Riyadh, Moscow, and the West as part of a carefully managed strategy against the Baathist regime in Iraq and against Türkiye. Hafez benefited from Israel’s role in safeguarding the minority-based Syrian regime and even welcomed cooperation with the Americans during the 1990 war against Saddam. Bashar did the opposite at every turn.
It must also be said that the Assad regime, a product of the Cold War, had nearly exhausted its political lifespan before Bashar came to power. His rise offered only a narrow window of opportunity. It required him to reposition Syria in line with the post-Cold War era and a region dominated by a single global power. Instead, he repeatedly chose the wrong course, mismanaging every major moment until his final days in office. Recent information confirms that Moscow “abandoned” Bashar roughly ten days before the regime collapsed, when Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces carried out a rapid military campaign in Aleppo’s countryside and began their march toward Damascus. Russia realized that the fall of the regime was inevitable.
Bashar’s downfall reverberated across the region and the world. He collapsed before the eyes of Iran and its allies, who this time were unable to save him. With his departure, Iran’s influence also receded, and its imperial project in that strategically important region crumbled. Syria was finally freed from a criminal regime, though the regional repercussions are still unfolding.
