The fate of Hezbollah’s arms is no longer a domestic dispute between advocates of sovereignty and supporters of the “resistance.” Since the 2023–2024 war with Israel, this question has been distilling into an existential crisis facing the party.
The slogan raised by the leader of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, “We will die before surrendering the weapons,” reflects his awareness that his camp has no other option but to cling to what remains of its arsenal. Abandoning its arms would break Hezbollah’s political and ideological foundations.
These actions are not mere reflections of political intransigence. Given its rigid ideology and uncompromising idealism, and because Iran’s regional project is in its DNA, Hezbollah is not an agile actor with the capacity to fundamentally change in nature. Moreover, it has built its power around the notion that weapons are an identity, not merely a means to an end.
In truth, the Lebanese have never associated Hezbollah with a domestic political or economic project. Its engagement in public affairs has always revolved around the “resistance” and the imperatives of regional conflicts. Thus, surrendering its arms would entail redefining the party from scratch and sacrificing its raison d'etre.
Operating with these restrictive parameters, Hezbollah has dragged its feet. Its bets verge on wishful thinking: the Lebanese state remaining too weak to follow through on its commitment to disarm the party, a new episode of regional chaos that destabilizes Syria’s emerging political authorities, and the materialization of the high-level assurances it has received Tehran’s top brass regarding its survival and armament.
That is, Hezbollah is betting that it will get lucky- or even awaiting miracles. The fate of these matters is totally beyond Hezbollah’s control, and external factors (that are consistently going against it) will determine how things play out.
After years of collapse, Lebanon’s state institutions are steadily, albeit slowly, consolidating and enhancing their credibility in the eyes of a broadening segment of the population. This trajectory undermines the slander and vilification of the state that Hezbollah has long used to challenge the state’s legitimacy and justify its own existence.
As for its wager on vacuums in Syria that would grant it more room for maneuvre, current developments on the point in the opposite direction. The political and military situation in Syria suggests that the weight of open-ended geopolitical conflicts and regional actors are declining, consolidating the new regime in Damascus.
Even Iranian support, which had constituted the cornerstone of Hezbollah’s existence for decades, is increasingly constrained. Tehran is grappling with a severe economic crisis amid volatile shifts in the internal balance of power between the different wings of the regime. Iran is preparing for a new phase, all while trying to put the military and security apparatus (that had been battered by deep Israeli strikes during the 12-day war) back together. These considerations have compelled Iran to prioritize its military and financial needs over coming to the aid of its allies, foremost among them Hezbollah.
All of that means the party is fighting for its very survival. However, while turning to politics has offered armed movements elsewhere in the world a lifeline, allowing them to maintain some influence, material conditions have left Hezbollah hostage to its weapons.
The Irish Republican Army, despite being deeply rooted in the conflict with Britain, pursued a clear, localized national cause: unifying Ireland and defending the rights of nationalist Catholics. That is why it managed to survive the shift from armed struggle to a political course that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which left Sinn Fein in a strong position politically.
Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), despite becoming involved in the drug trade and losing some of their legitimacy as result, was nonetheless pursuing a domestic agenda to a social and economic struggle in Colombia. The FARC thereby managed to conclude a peace agreement that, despite only being partially implemented, granted them a political foothold.
Hezbollah, in contrast, has never pursued a genuine domestic cause that could underpin a shift toward politics. Even its claims to defending Lebanon’s sovereignty and confronting occupation were never presented as ultimate, final objectives. These goals were presented as means for furthering regional ambitions. Its ideological link to its axis, as well as its intrinsic role in the regional power struggle, make any fundamental change to its nature nearly impossible. To give up its arms would not be to adjust its strategy; it would be to abandon the reason for its existence.
Thus, the party appears bound to keep behaving this way. It will continue to vie for maintaining weapons and transnational function. Even after being put out of action, it will continue to wait for gradual decline. Its intransigence could, in turn, perpetuate the decay of Lebanon’s state institutions. If it does, the country would go from being a political battleground to being home to a failed state, with the Lebanese people paying the price many times over.
