The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in the Chinese city of Tianjin placed the Arab region, particularly the Gulf, at the heart of the processes reshaping the balance of power in Eurasia. Presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping and attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and other leaders, the Summit further consolidated new geopolitical realities in the Middle East, strengthening the diversification of alliances that allow for avoiding reliance on Washington alone.
More than any other since the SCO’s founding as a security framework in 2001 and its gradual expansion over a quarter century (it now represents nearly 40 percent of the world’s population), the Tianjin Summit underscored the organization’s growing relevance for the Middle East. Indeed, Iran became a full member in 2023, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt obtained “dialogue partner” status in 2022.
This shift has effectively made the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf into a natural extension of the Eurasian bloc, positioning the region at the center of future trade routes, logistics, and energy flows. In one sign of this new reality, ten Gulf ports were ranked among the world’s seventy most efficient in 2024.
Most importantly, the principles of the “Tianjin Declaration” clearly resonate with the current mood in the Arab world, particularly on questions of sovereignty, non-interference, and global governance reform.
It was unequivocal in rejecting tutelage or unilateral sanctions, positions deeply familiar to most Arab capitals that have long been wary of Western pressure framed as a defense of democracy and human rights. The statement also made a striking call for granting developing countries, including Arab states, more weight within international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund.
These themes are inseparable from the summit’s long-standing push for equitable development, particularly debt relief. Yet, this year the statement went further: regulating the field of artificial intelligence and technology transfers, and freeing them from political constraints that hinder many nations’ progress and exacerbate their economic crises.
In this context, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls to accelerate de-dollarization, coupled with proposals to establish a development bank managed by the SCO, were not merely slogans of a confrontation with the West. Rather, they reflect emerging economic and geopolitical realities that have placed Gulf oil and gas at the heart of a multi-currency financial framework and a multipolar political order.
Nonetheless, this effort presents both challenges and opportunities for the Gulf states, which hold massive dollar-denominated surpluses exceeding six trillion dollars in sovereign wealth fund assets, and which export most of their energy in US dollars. However, it is one component of a deliberate repositioning strategy led by Gulf governments: diversifying their economies through multipronged initiatives, foremost among them linking China’s Belt and Road Initiative to maritime corridors through the Suez Canal and the Arabian Sea, thereby enhancing the strategic position of Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia as pivotal hubs in the emerging global trade map.
From this perspective, the Summit’s rejection of what the leaders called a “Cold War mentality” is particularly significant, emphasizing the economic dimension of security in today’s world and underscoring the need for a shared security framework that addresses the concerns and interests of all parties. While the message was aimed primarily at Washington and NATO, it is also relevant for the Middle East, as the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran are intertwined with global power struggles and the multipolar contest around the US security umbrella in the region.
In this sense, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, alongside BRICS, brings Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran to the same table at a non-Western platform. It thereby offers a space, creating a new framework for managing disputes without Western mediation, with all its biases, shortcomings, and declining efficacy.
If Afghanistan has been a testing ground for the SCO’s intentions, the Middle East will be the ultimate test of its ability to translate principles into material shifts that reshape spheres of influence and to open the door to new actors to play a role in shaping regional security. All of that could pull Arab security out of the web of entrenched polarization.
The Summit’s outcomes and its aspiration to affirm the end of US unipolarity are not merely academic abstractions to Arab states. They reflect the material realities that Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo are navigating as they seek to balance relations with Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.
Still, divergences within the organization persist, especially between China and India. Moreover, whether the SCO has the capacity to evolve by translating statements into robust institutional frameworks remains an open question. These challenges do not, however, take anything away from the Summit’s success in shaping a new geopolitical climate that lays the groundwork for an institutional alternative to the Western-dominated order.
The Tianjin Summit has yet to develop a new global system, but it has placed the Middle East at the center of this process, meaning that Arab actors’ roles, interests, and choices are key to shaping the balance of the new era. From the ports of the Red Sea to the oil fields of the Gulf, from investment forums to negotiating tables, the region is asserting itself as an indispensable partner in crafting the world of tomorrow.
