The dynamics of “adaptation” to the regional shift in the Near East have reopened a number of dormant and postponed issues. As Israel’s pursuit of domination persists, the push for “normalization” is accelerating, sometimes in the name of political realism, and at other times in the name of betting on the future. Advanced technology, as well as the shifting priorities of what remains of the major powers, have changed things.
In Lebanon and Iraq in particular, we have two cases that deserve our attention amid the region’s fast-moving track and its surroundings.
In Lebanon, the authorities’ decision to “negotiate” with Israel, a step that comes at the expense of what had been Iran’s clear dominance through Hezbollah, has led to a disruption in the “political debate.”
Indeed, voices that had long been suppressed over the decades have risen again, reviving what they consider “sovereignist” demands. Meanwhile, their opponents see their ambitions as old “isolationist” projects that had been defeated with the collapse of the May 17, 1983 Agreement signed under Israeli occupation, and then again after the Taif Accords and following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.
Today, some politicians and media figures speak about the May 17 Agreement imposed by Israel after its 1982 invasion of Lebanon with great enthusiasm - sometimes even nostalgia. At the time, the Jewish state enjoyed strong support from then US President Ronald Reagan’s administration. It is self-evident that Iran leveraging its strategic ties with the former Syrian regime was key to redrawing the Lebanese scene and overturning the balance between victor and vanquished.
However, there are hardliners across the Lebanese spectrum who have always been and still are deeply divided over Lebanon’s identity. It is worth recalling that the roots of the Lebanese identity crisis have, since the 19th century, facilitated every form of foreign intervention.
Today, under the Trump administration, many believe that Lebanon is returning to the landscape of 1982 shaped in Tel Aviv by the ultra-nationalist camp of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, as well as the “hawks” of the Reagan administration in Washington.
More than that, Lebanese affairs have been left to figures and diplomats either aligned with what used to be called the “isolationist Christian right”, such ambassadors Michel Issa, Tom Barrack, and the lobby supporting that right, or Likudists, such as envoy Morgan Ortagus and those backing her in the corridors of the Capitol.
Meanwhile, the full alignment between Washington and Tel Aviv with regard to the Near Eastern have shifted the United States’ approach to Iran. As we know, the American posture of “understanding and sympathetic silence” under Democratic presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden has turned into open hostility under Donald Trump, notably through the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the nuclear agreement with Iran.
In fact, many in Washington long treated the Iranian leadership as a fact of life that could be managed. This leadership has political and military “weight” that can be leveraged by those who understand it, and it governs one of the Middle East’s most significant and largest countries.
Indeed, Iran is a demographic power of 92 million people who reside in a strategic location in one of the world’s hottest regions. It is also an economic giant whose vast landmass holds one of the largest oil reserves in the world. Culturally and religiously, Iran remains the largest Shiite Muslim state, and its clerical authorities wield influence wherever there are Shiites.
Iran also maintains notable relations with China and Russia, to say nothing of Central Asian states. With regard to the Arab world, we have seen for decades numerous manifestations of the “Iranian condition” in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.
Accordingly, Washington’s “pragmatists” - not only its Democrats - have insisted on the US having the “final say” on Iran, rather than leaving it hostage to the whims and personal considerations of Benjamin Netanyahu.
The situation is entirely different now. It is obvious that several countries are experiencing seeing Iran’s influence recede along Israel’s fronts... and Lebanon may well be the weakest point in this border system.
Even if it wished to break away, however, Iraq does not appear today fully capable of distancing itself from the changes unfolding in the region. The sensitivity of Iraq’s position has several dimensions:
First, Iraq shares a long land border with Iran.
Second, Shiites constitute a major demographic force within Iraq, especially in the south.
Third, a number of Shiite parties that have been in power since the US invasion of 2003 have leaders, networks, and militias that once fought under a banner opposed to the Iraqi army, which was dissolved by the authorities set up by the US after 2003.
Fourth, Iraq’s “federal coexistence deal” among Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds, who enjoy self-rule in a territory on the border with the Kurdish regions of and Türkiye.
Fifth, the US maintains a military presence in Iraq, and Washington continues to monitor developments closely. Its influence there is reinforced by the “Israel’s long arm,” both militarily and in intelligence.
Accordingly, as Iran’s “dominos” fall and as Tehran’s influence shrinks rapidly, Lebanon and Iraq are becoming increasingly vulnerable after Iran’s leaders have effectively kept them under its cloak and considered them part of its strategic arsenal.
Accordingly, I believe any optimism about either country fully regaining its vitality is misguided. With Netanyahu in power, optimism is a losing bet. With the absence of American restraints over the Likud hardliners, the region remains open to every unruly outcome.
