Lebanon finds itself in an unenviable political and military situation. At this difficult stage of its modern history, the US is exerting unprecedented political pressure; not a day goes by without an Israeli assault, and Hezbollah, the party primarily concerned, is not backing down. In fact, Hezbollah has never deviated from its insistence on maintaining its arms despite the collapse of the deterrence it had celebrated since 2006.
It is clear that the overwhelming majority of Lebanese will not tolerate the maintenance of Hezbollah’s arms in the way that it has since the end of the civil war in 1990. The Lebanese seek a strong, capable, and modern state. This is a legitimate and justifiable position, though a segment of the population is turning a blind eye - if not encouraging - Israel’s aggression in order to get rid of the party.
The previous status quo has become untenable following Hezbollah’s dramatic defeat: the ongoing assassination of its senior commanders, with the pager and walkie-talkie attacks that exposed the scale of this once impenetrable organization, and the obliteration of its weapons depots and villages and towns of southern Lebanon, which have yet to be rebuilt a full year later amid Israel’s ongoing attacks.
Some believe that Hezbollah committed a historic mistake when it waged the “support war,” which failed to achieve its primary (least nominally) objective of supporting Gaza and its people. Over 77,500 people, according to figures published by the Palestinian Studies Institute, have died in Gaza, which is now in ruins.
Thus, instead of the Lebanese southern front supporting the Palestinian people, it ended up granting Israel a golden opportunity. With unprecedented international support and solidarity following October 7, 2023, Israel pounced and destroyed the military and political infrastructure of Hezbollah over 40 years after the party evolved through the direct and continuous support from Iran.
In any case, the decision to restrict weapons to the hands of the Lebanese state is the correct one. It is long overdue and irreversible. Nonetheless, that is not to say that the arms should be confiscated by force. This approach poses major risks given Lebanon’s social composition, as well as Hezbollah’s doctrine and its existential attachment to its arms. Even though it could continue political activity without arms, just like the other Lebanese parties, it has insisted on this position for ideological, political, and regional-project reasons.
The Lebanese National Reconciliation Document (the Taif Agreement), reached in 1989, stipulated the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. Hezbollah, however, was exempt because Lebanese territory remained under occupation until 2000. The polarization that followed the 2006 war, with the national debate revolving around the party’s responsibility for the destruction and accusations that Hezbollah had “dragged” Lebanon into a war that brought only destruction, was mirrored in 2024.
If Hezbollah must account for the major shift of the past two years and hand over its arms both south and north of the Litani, Israel’s allies, foremost among them the United States, must compel the Jewish state to end its daily attacks on Lebanon and the Lebanese if the arrangements for the next phase are to be implemented. Indeed, the talks received an additional boost after civilians were tasked with heading the Lebanese and Israeli delegations to the Mechanism.
It is clear that Lebanon has nowhere to run - not from Israel’s assault nor the political pressure - to reach an agreement that adds to the “breakthroughs”, political and non-political, in Syria and several other Arab states.
