The latest book of renowned American diplomat, historian, and strategist Professor A. Wess Mitchell “Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger” was published in October.
Attila the Hun founded the Hunnic Empire in the first half of the fifth century; Kissinger needs no introduction. That is, the book covers fifteen centuries of the art, business, and perhaps even pains of administering states, kingdoms, and empires.
Why have intellectual elites from across the globe been so captivated by this substantial work?
One reason might be its timely release. Humanity is entering a new era of instability. Great powers with the size of continents are competing over territory, resources, and prestige. Hard power seems to have become decisive as we see an erosion of diplomacy’s capacity for overcoming militarily superior rivals, maneuvering around them, and holding one’s ground against them.
In the author’s view, diplomacy seems to have become a sort of lost art, especially after Western elites adopted the illusion that globalization and universal democracy would create a borderless, harmonious world as “democracies never go to war with one another.” All of that has turned out to be misguided.
Since the dawn of history, humanity has been plagued by conflict; that is beyond doubt. At times, these conflicts were fought between individuals; at other times, groups collectively fought others. Eventually, these conflicts led to the emergence of states, then kingdoms, and then empires. At every stage, there was a need to confront numerous and fierce enemies who could not be defeated by force of arms alone.
In such dramatic moments, prudent leaders would turn to diplomacy as they sought favorable arrangements that would allow them to thwart enemies who seemed unstoppable.
Indeed, diplomacy has shaped humanity’s turning points for over fifteen centuries. Sometimes for the best, and sometimes for the worst. Figures from all kinds of backgrounds have practiced intricate arts of governance. Some of them made diplomatic achievements, while others were responsible for calamities that we have never forgotten.
Among the giants of diplomacy are Cardinal Richelieu, Metternich, Bismarck, and Kissinger. Yet the pages of diplomatic history have always also featured lesser-known components whom the author describes as rogues, eunuchs, drunkards, and fools.
A close reading of the book allows for drawing the conclusion: fortune has always favored great powers endowed with foresight who could build successful alliances, pit their enemies against one another, and, when necessary, make peace with their fiercest adversaries.
One of the most remarkable aspects of this pioneering work is that it includes several expansive historical case studies to illustrate how the practical arts and skills of diplomacy allowed for overcoming the narrow pursuit of brute military power, especially when actors were confronted with difficult challenges.
The historian and diplomat presents us with models of effective diplomacy: from the Byzantine Empire’s approach to the invading forces of Attila the Hun in the fifth century AD, to the agility of fifteenth-century Venice in dealing with the emerging power of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. He then takes us through the brilliant eighteenth-century Austrian strategist Wenzel von Kaunitz’s navigation of the confrontation between the Habsburgs and Prussia, until he arrives at the American political fox Henry Kissinger’s handling of China in the 1970s.
Can the factors that determine whether great-power diplomacy succeeds or fails be identified?
The book seeks to do so through leaders’ characteristics and leadership models. History tells us of dexterous leaders and advisors whose flexibility allowed them to overcome crises. However, these leaders would not have achieved their successes without the cadre of diplomats in their institutions. These diplomats provided them with essential information, advice, and expertise drawn from both their scholarship and practical experience, which allowed them to understand the culture, history, and language of other states, whether rivals or allies.
Is it a coincidence that this work has emerged as President Trump’s administration inches away from a military, rather than diplomatic, adventure on the Latin American continent, starting with Venezuela- or is it fate?
The answer does not matter. What matters is the message of the book: allies, even small states, are crucial, and occasional concessions are a necessary component of success. Indeed, victory can turn into failure when it is achieved at the expense of durable stability.
From Mitchell to Trump... Those with ears should listen.
