Much has been said about the appointment of a civilian (former ambassador Simon Karam) to head of the Lebanese delegation to the Mechanism- the body established to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire reached on November 26 last year between Lebanon and Israel.
Some of the explanations of this move and its messages were entirely detached from reality: supporters and allies of Hezbollah considered the appointment a step towards gradual normalization with Israel or a sign of moving toward political negotiations with the Israeli enemy.
Others, however, believe that this appointment may signal stronger or more serious engagement in this process. Appointing a civilian figure does not, neither in principle nor in practice, imply normalization. The goals of the negotiations, its frame of reference and the course it takes, answer this question.
The Lebanese position is clear: no peace talks with Israel and no direct negotiations outside the framework of the Mechanism. Israel has not fully respected the agreement/declaration: it was supposed to withdraw from the South to the Blue Line within sixty days (point 12 of the declaration), which of course did not happen. It did not release the prisoners either; on the contrary, Israel’s war intensified in ferocity and scale. Israel also occupied five hills for what it calls “security sovereignty.” This concept likewise applies to the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and southern Syria, southern Lebanon, and, more recently, the Beqaa.
Appointing a civilian does not change the nature or goal of indirect “technical” negotiations within the framework of the Mechanism on the implementation of the ceasefire, which Israel has not respected in practice.
The inclusion of civilian negotiators is entirely normal in technical negotiations given the issues being discussed. It is also important to recall that the current format of these negotiations fall under an international/UN committee (the United States, France, and the UN peacekeeping forces in the South). It should likewise be recalled that the goal of the negotiations is Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the release of prisoners, and the establishment of a viable security arrangement that consolidates stability, security, and safety along the border. In this context, and with the mandate of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon ending in late 2026, an alternative international/UN framework for monitoring this process and reinforcing stability must be found.
The official Lebanese position in this regard is clear: Lebanon wants to revive the 1949 Armistice Agreement, with the possibility of reinforcing this agreement that Israel, in various ways, refuses to re-enter: deploying UN monitors on both sides of the line in a balanced manner.
As for talk of indirect- or “soft,” as some call it- normalization, the Lebanese position is clear: Lebanon remains committed to the Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut, which seeks a comprehensive, just, and durable peace grounded entirely in United Nations Resolutions.
Today, because of Israel’s policies, we are extremely far from achieving its goals. Accordingly, safeguarding security and stability along the southern border is necessary, as is preventing Lebanon from becoming a playground for regional conflicts or for intermittent, open-ended proxy wars employed in the “Great Game” of the region.
Today, Lebanon must intensify its engagement with both the international community and the Arab states. Both official diplomacy and public diplomacy (efforts to influence opinion-makers and decision-makers in the capitals that matter), in order to support the Lebanese position outlined above.
We must warn (and there are many lessons to this effect from both the recent and distant past are) that the game of buying time through tenuous arrangements and makeshift settlements, which some may be pursuing, would destroy Lebanon over time. It is a game that will lead only to further complications and difficulties at a moment when the Middle Eastern is undergoing grave and fundamental changes. For this reason, supporting the official Lebanese position, and ensuring genuine adherence to this position by all Lebanese components, remains more than necessary if Lebanon is to reinforce its state.
